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Abstract
“Say on pay” reforms have been advocated and implemented
in many major jurisdictions over the last decade, including the US
and UK. Singapore and Hong Kong, however, which are recognized
by the World Bank to have the second- and fourth-best regulatory
systems in the world for investors to do business in respectively, have
bucked the international trend of allowing shareholders a binding or
advisory vote on the remuneration of corporate managers. “Say on
pay” has either been rejected or ignored in the latest round of
reforms to the corporate governance codes in Singapore and Hong
Kong despite studies which have found that they have the highest
executive pay in Asia, with base salaries for top executives rising to
more than 25% higher than their US counterparts. Could this be the
curious case of “Asian values”?
While Singapore and Hong Kong share the same common law
legal traditions with the US and UK within the same bucket of liberal
market economies (LMEs), as the “Varieties of Capitalism”
framework would suggest, they may be said to practice a different
form of “regulatory capitalism” from their Anglo-American
counterparts under their corporate governance regimes. This article
looks at the institutions of political economy within Singapore and
Hong Kong, and how they may explain this variance in “say on pay”
regulation between jurisdictions. It argues that this may be attributed
to a complex combination of institutional factors such as Singapore
and Hong Kong’s distinctive patterns of corporate ownership, the
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relative restraint of institutional investors, the role of the state and
ultimately the socio-political culture and ethos within a non-Western
liberal democratic framework.
It concludes with what the
implications of this variance may be for future legal reforms on “say
on pay” and theories of corporate governance in the broader
context—namely, why are certain legal reforms not adopted in
certain jurisdictions, and if adopted, how effective are such reforms
likely to be?
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INTRODUCTION

Executive remuneration lies at the heart of current discussions
on corporate governance reforms, which have driven the regulatory
diffusion of “say on pay” reforms in many major jurisdictions over
the last decade, including the US and UK. 1 Excessive payments to
corporate executives have repeatedly been cited as reasons for many
corporate failures and remain a highly controversial and politicized
issue in many countries. “Say on pay” may be defined broadly as a
regular mandatory binding or advisory shareholders’ vote on the
remuneration of the company’s executive directors and/or managers
as required by law.2 This departs from the established position in
corporate law, which has generally assigned decision-making power
on executive remuneration to the board of directors as part of their
management authority. As states restructure from the period of neoliberalism preceding the global financial crisis in 2008 and take on a
more interventionist and progressive agenda,3 “say on pay” reforms
have altered the corporate balance of power under the implicit
corporate contract between shareholders and managers by according
shareholders greater say over such remuneration matters. 4 Populist
pressures over executive compensation, which were deemed either
excessive or misaligned with corporate performance, have further
transformed this from a corporate governance issue to a broader issue
on social policy. 5 From this vantage point, society and not just
shareholders have a stake on the regulation of executive remuneration.

1
Randall S. Thomas & Christoph van der Elst, Say on Pay Around the World, 92
WASH. U. L. REV. 653, 659–68 (2015); OECD, OECD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FACTBOOK
2019 164–65 (2019), https://www.oecd.org/corporate/Corporate-Governance-Factbook.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CP57-WMKD] [hereinafter OECD F ACTBOOK 2019].
2
Thomas & van der Elst, supra note 1, at 658.
3
See David Levi-Faur, The Regulatory State and Regulatory Capitalism: An
Institutional Perspective, in HANDBOOK ON THE POLITICS OF REGULATION 667–68 (David
Levi-Faur ed., 2011) [hereinafter Levi-Faur, Regulatory State and Regulatory Capitalism]
(discusses the concepts of the regulatory state and regulatory capitalism); David Levi-Faur,
The Global Diffusion of Regulatory Capitalism, 598 ANN. AM. ACAD. POL. SCI. 12, 14 (2005).
4
Michael Klausner, The “Corporate Contract” Today, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK
OF CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE 84, 86 (Jeffrey N. Gordon & Wolf-Georg Ringe eds.,
2018).
5
Guido Ferrarini & Maria Cristina Ungureanu, Executive Remuneration, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE 334, 351 (Jeffrey N. Gordon &
Wolf-Georg Ringe eds., 2018).
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Singapore and Hong Kong, however, have bucked the
international trend of allowing shareholders a binding or advisory
vote on the remuneration of corporate executives. In Singapore and
Hong Kong, “say on pay” has either been rejected or ignored in the
latest round of reforms to the corporate governance codes. 6
Nonetheless, studies have found that Singapore and Hong Kong have
the highest executive pay in Asia, with total guaranteed cash (base
salaries and total fixed allowances) for top executives in 2016 rising
to more than 25% higher than their US counterparts. In 2016, for
every US$100 that top executives in the US earned in base salary,
their counterparts in Singapore and Hong Kong made US$132 and
US$128 respectively.7 Despite their recognition by the World Bank
to have the second- and fourth-best regulatory systems in the world
for investors to do business in respectively, along with a higher score
on the shareholder rights index as compared with the US, 8 the
conspicuous absence of “say on pay” reforms in Singapore and Hong
Kong in comparison with the leading Western jurisdictions 9 presents
an interesting anomaly for examination. One may recall the earlier
debate on “Asian values” as the supposed antithesis to Western
norms, 10 when “Confucian capitalism” became the rallying call in
many East Asian economies in the late twentieth century. 11
Singapore was one of the most forceful proponents of “Asian values”,
6
HKEX, CONSULTATION CONCLUSIONS: REVIEW OF THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
CODE AND RELATED LISTING RULES (2018), https://www.hkex.com.hk/-/media/HKEXMarket/News/Market-Consultations/2016-Present/November-2017-Review-of-the-CGcode-and-Related-LRs/Conclusions-(July-2018)/cp2017111cc.pdf?la=en
[https://perma.cc/E95X-TGH8]; MAS, RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE COUNCIL 20 (2018), https://www.mas.gov.sg/-/media/MAS/Regulations-andFinancial-Stability/Regulatory-and-Supervisory-Framework/Corporate-Governance-ofListed-Companies/Consultation-2018-Jan-16/Response-to-consult/Response-paper-onCouncils-recommendations.pdf [https://perma.cc/8BWX-4SEU].
7
Asia Sees Widening Salaries Gap—Willis Towers Watson Study, W ILLIS T OWERS
W ATSON (Apr. 6, 2017), https://www.willistowerswatson.com/en-TH/news/2017/04/asiasees-widening-salaries-gap [https://perma.cc/MB47-5N8N].
8
WORLD BANK GROUP, DOING BUSINESS 2019 TRAINING FOR REFORM (16th edition) 5,
176, 202, 212 (Oct. 31, 2018),
https://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/doingBusiness/media/AnnualReports/English/DB2019-report_web-version.pdf [https://perma.cc/RNQ7-P8PF].
9
See Thomas & van der Elst, supra note 1.
10
Humphrey Hawksley, Asian Values, YALEGLOBAL ONLINE (Sept. 27, 2018),
https://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/asian-values [https://perma.cc/Q9CZ-G4QE].
11
Teemu Ruskola, Theorizing The Corporation: Liberal, Confucian, And Socialist
Perspectives, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE CORPORATION 298, 298 (Thomas Clarke et
al. eds., 2019).
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and argued that they were preferable to “Western” norms and were
essential to achieve economic growth.12
Yet, Asia, notwithstanding the variances amongst themselves,
may be said to be home to a set of institutions of political economy
distinct from the West, in particular the US and the UK. 13 These
differences include distinct patterns of corporate ownership and the
common use of pyramidal or conglomerate holding structures
amongst group companies, as well as cultural variances within a
diverse range of economic, legal, and political systems at different
levels of market development. 14 They may be said to practice a
different form of “regulatory capitalism” 15 from their AngloAmerican counterparts under their corporate governance regimes,
despite being ostensibly in the same bucket of liberal market
economies (LMEs), as the “Varieties of Capitalism” framework
would suggest.16
Following North’s definition as a starting point,
“[i]nstitutions are the humanly devised constraints that structure
political, economic, and social interaction.”17 Institutions, therefore,
are devised by rule-makers to impose constraints on and shape the
incentives of rule-takers. Regulatory capitalism theory posits that
governance and regulation are manifestations of the underlying
institutions of political economy and how they determine policy
outcomes in the capitalist order. 18 This implies different regulatory
outcomes for societies with different structures of political economy.
Governance, as defined by the World Bank, is “the process through
12

Meng Seng Wee & Dan W. Puchniak, Derivative Actions in Singapore: Mundanely
Non-Asian, Intriguingly Non-American and at the Forefront of the Commonwealth, in THE
DERIVATIVE ACTION IN ASIA: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 323, 353 (Dan
W. Puchniak et al. eds., 2012).
13
OECD, OECD SURVEY OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORKS IN ASIA 5
(2017), https://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/OECD-Survey-Corporate-Governance-FrameworksAsia.pdf [https://perma.cc/4QJ4-VWPJ] [hereinafter OECD S URVEY 2017].
14
See OECD, REFORM PRIORITIES IN ASIA: TAKING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE TO A
HIGHER LEVEL (2013) 13–16, https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/governance/reform-priorities-inasia_9789264204416-en#page1 [https://perma.cc/T7JX-4MXA] [hereinafter R EFORM
PRIORITIES IN ASIA] (discussing the corporate governance landscape in Asian countries).
15
Levi-Faur, Regulatory State and Regulatory Capitalism, supra note 3, at 668–69.
16
PETER A. HALL & DAVID SOSKICE, An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism, in
VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM: THE INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF COMPARATIVE
ADVANTAGE 1, 8–9 (Peter A. Hall & David Soskice eds., 2003).
17
Douglass C. North, Institutions, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 97, 97 (1991).
18
David Levi-Faur, David, From “Big Government” to “Big Governance”, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF GOVERNANCE 4, 14 (David Levi-Faur ed., 2012).

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2019

2020]

U. PA. ASIAN L. REV.

227

which state and non-state actors interact to design and implement
policies within a given set of formal and informal rules that shape and
are shaped by power.”19 This suggests that corporate governance is
not homogeneous across time and space, as corporate governance
systems need to be understood as institutionalized relationships
amongst the spectrum of social, economic and political actors, the
different varieties of which informs our search for suitable regulatory
design and alternatives.20
In this light, this article adopts an institutional approach and
explores how the variances in “say on pay” regulations between
Singapore and Hong Kong on one hand, and the US and UK, on the
other, may be explained by the differences in the political and
economic institutions amongst each polity. Singapore and Hong
Kong present complex phenomena—both are small entrepôt Asian
city-states sharing similar colonial common law institutions with the
US and the UK as hybrids of Chinese and Western cultures. Yet, they
are not liberal democracies in the Western sense. They have
nevertheless achieved unprecedented success in their institutional
reforms to benefit from the preceding decades of economic
globalization.21 Incidentally, despite their strong rule of law and low
corruption,22 they have been highlighted in The Economist’s crony
capitalism ranking, which purports to measure the extent economic
elites with close relations with the government seek to profit by rentseeking. 23 Nevertheless, any apparent shortcomings have not
impeded the sustained economic growth miracles, which have rapidly
transformed two of Asia’s four “tiger” economies (along with South
19
WORLD BANK GROUP, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2017: GOVERNANCE AND THE
LAW
41
(2017),
https://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/wdr2017
[https://perma.cc/54QB-VJ8W].
20
See Dieter Plehwe, Modes Of Economic Governance: The Dynamics Of Governance
At The National And Firm Level, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF GOVERNANCE 388, 388
(David Levi-Faur ed., 2012).
21
See generally Gordon Redding et al., Hong Kong: Hybrid Capitalism as Catalyst, in
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ASIAN BUSINESS SYSTEMS 34, 50 (Michael A. Witt & Gordon
Redding, 2014).
22
See WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT, RULE OF LAW INDEX 2019 16 (2019),
https://worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/files/documents/WJP-ROLI-2019Single%20Page%20View-Reduced.pdf [https://perma.cc/G9VS-WCHG] (noting that
Singapore and Hong Kong are ranked 13th and 16th in their rule of law, respectively, behind
the UK but ahead of the US).
23
Planet
Plutocrat,
THE
ECONOMIST
(Mar.
15,
2014),
https://www.economist.com/international/2014/03/15/planet-plutocrat
[https://perma.cc/44F5-VXN3].
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Korea and Taiwan) over the last fifty years. As of 2017, the Hong
Kong Stock Exchange (HKEX) is the world’s largest stock exchange
in terms of total value traded as a percentage of GDP and sixth largest
in terms of market capitalization, with the Singapore Exchange (SGX)
as the largest amongst medium exchanges in terms of the number of
IPOs and listed entities. 24 In 2018, the HKEX attracted more
shareholder capital than either the New York Stock Exchange or
London Stock Exchange, and led the world in IPO fund-raising. 25
Singapore’s GDP per capita is now higher than that of the United
States, and it recently topped the US as the world’s most competitive
economy, with Hong Kong close behind in third place. 26 This makes
Singapore and Hong Kong fascinating subjects of study in corporate
governance to ascertain the possible reasons for different regulatory
approaches for apparently common corporate governance problems
faced in different jurisdictions.
In this connection, this article critiques the “Varieties of
Capitalism” theory and other similar orthodox corporate governance
theories in respect of their applicability to the Asian corporate context,
which remains understudied despite the growing economic impact of
Asian companies in the fastest-growing region in the world. 27 The
analysis reveals that further refinement to the existing orthodox
theories and metrics of corporate governance is needed. In doing so,
the author seeks to contribute to the increasing interest in Asian
models of corporate governance and joins an emerging group of
corporate law scholars by providing an integrated and contextual
view of corporate governance on a comparative basis.28 It argues that
24

OECD FACTBOOK 2019, supra note 1, at 19, 21.
Takeshi Kihara, Hong Kong Leads World In IPOs For 2018, Driven By Tech Listings,
NIKKEI
ASIAN
REV.
(Dec.
20,
2018,
03:22
AM),
https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Markets/Hong-Kong-leads-world-in-IPOs-for-2018driven-by-tech-listings [https://perma.cc/UN6W-LBDB].
26
WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, THE GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 2019 xiii (Klaus
Schwab ed., 2019),
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_TheGlobalCompetitivenessReport2019.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MQY3-QBYK].
27
Kensaku Ihara & Yusho Cho, Asia Is Home To 50% Of World’s Fastest Growing
Companies,
NIKKEI
ASIAN
REVIEW
(May
9,
2019,
2:35
PM),
https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Companies/Asia-is-home-to-50-of-world-s-fastestgrowing-companies2 [https://perma.cc/5HPA-N9LW].
28
See generally Klaus J. Hopt, Comparative Corporate Governance: The State of the
Art and International Regulation, in COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: A
FUNCTIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL ANALYSIS 3, 3-101 (Andreas M. Fleckner & Klaus J. Hopt,
25
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the underlying capitalist institutions of political economy matter, and
divergence in these institutions can lead to fundamental differences
in the adoption, trajectory and ultimately, the success of regulatory
reforms. It concludes that these insights are critical to understanding
why “say on pay” reforms are, and are likely to remain, contentious
issues in Singapore and Hong Kong, and if eventually adopted, are
unlikely to function in a similar manner as compared to other
common law jurisdictions. Such insights may form the basis of
evaluating other types of corporate governance issues and reforms on
a comparative basis, and may also yield important insights for other
Asian jurisdictions.
This paper proceeds as follows. Part II sets out the theoretical
framework of comparative corporate governance, while Part III
provides an overview of the various “say on pay” reforms in the US
and UK, along with other jurisdictions. Part IV examines the
institutions of political economy within Singapore and Hong Kong
and how they may explain this variance in “say on pay” regulation
between jurisdictions. Part V discusses what the policy implications
are for Singapore and Hong Kong, and Part VI concludes.

II.

“SAY ON PAY” REFORMS AND THE CAPITALIST
CONUNDRUM FOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

The universality of the corporate form, as the fundamental
pillar of modern capitalism across a variety of jurisdictions, suggests
that business corporations “face a fundamentally similar set of legal
problems— in all jurisdictions.”29 From a functionalist perspective,
economic rationality and efficiency dictate that corporate laws should
face similar economic pressures for reform towards the same
objective.30 “Global governance” standards set by organizations such
as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) have further played an influential role towards harmonizing
corporate governance reforms at an international level, especially
eds., 2013) (a comparative analysis of economic, legal, and social determinants of corporate
governance based on reports from thirty-three countries).
29
John Armour et al., What is Corporate Law?, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE
LAW—A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 1, 1 (Reinier Kraakman et al. eds.,
2017). These “five basic legal characteristics of the business corporation” are “legal
personality, limited liability, transferable shares, delegated management under a board
structure, and investor ownership.”
30
Id. at 4–5.
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after the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997-1998 and the Global
Financial Crisis in 2007-2008. 31 The G20/OECD Principles of
Corporate Governance (2015), for example, prescribes “say on pay”
as follows: “Shareholders should be able to make their views known,
including through votes at shareholder meetings, on the remuneration
of board members and/or key executives, as applicable. The equity
component of compensation schemes for board members and
employees should be subject to shareholder approval.” 32
Since “say on pay” was first introduced in the UK in 2002,
there has been a remarkable diffusion of such reforms in countries
including the US, Belgium, Sweden, and Switzerland. 33 Although
the trend might, at first sight, suggest regulatory convergence, there
are in fact a range of different forms of “say on pay” providing for
varying levels of stringency and shareholder power. Regulatory
variances demonstrate “partial convergence” and “divergencewithin-convergence” and adoption appears to be more prevalent in
the US and EU member states, compared to emerging market
economies. 34 According to the OECD’s 2019 survey, 51% of 49
countries surveyed have adopted “say on pay” on remuneration
policy, but there are wide variations amongst them, including whether
the shareholders’ vote is binding or advisory and the scope of such
approval. Countries are also divided on whether to require or only
recommend “say on pay,” even though there is a continued trend
toward increased disclosure of company remuneration policy and
remuneration levels.35
Singapore and Hong Kong represent two such anomalies,
where high compensation is often justified as a commercial decision
to attract talent to the company notwithstanding controversies arising
from time to time due to directors being rewarded with excessive
remuneration despite poor corporate performance. 36 While the
31
Jeffery N. Gordon, Convergence and Persistence in Corporate Law and Governance,
in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE 28, 32 (Jeffery N.
Gordon & Wolf-Georg Ringe eds., 2018).
32
OECD, G20/OECD PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 21 (2015),
https://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/Corporate-Governance-Principles-ENG.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HQA3-MTC8] [hereinafter OECD PRINCIPLES 2015].
33
Thomas & van der Elst, supra note 1, at 655, 658.
34
Gordon, supra note 31, at 43–44.
35
OECD FACTBOOK 2019, supra note 1, at 128–30.
36
See HKEX, CONSULTATION PAPER ON PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE LISTING
RULES
RELATING
TO
CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE
ISSUES
130
(2002),
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OECD considers “say on pay” to have been adopted in other Asian
countries such as China, Japan, and South Korea, the exact forms in
which such regulations take and are implemented in practice require
more detailed examination.
In South Korea, for example,
shareholders can set the aggregate amount available for board
remuneration, but decisions concerning the remuneration of
individual directors and senior management are often delegated to the
board in practice.37 In Japan, shareholder approval is only required
when there is a change in aggregate board compensation and
shareholders routinely approve such requests. 38 In China, aggregate
board remuneration is approved by the shareholders but they are not
able to propose remuneration structures or policies, and shareholder
voting is in any event perfunctory in the presence of prevalent
concentrated ownership structures. 39
These international regulatory developments may be better
understood when evaluated in the broader context of the respective
corporate governance framework and the wider environment beyond
the corporation—which together encompass different varieties of
capitalism. In this regard, North adds that, “[i]nstitutions are not
necessarily or even usually created to be socially efficient; rather they,
or at least the formal rules, are created to serve the interests of those
with the bargaining power to devise new rules.” 40 In this sense,
regulatory reform requires a political consensus between the state and
its key stakeholders, in particular political and corporate elites, with
the former concerned about political accountability and economic
growth and the latter concerned about their stakes in and success of
https://www.hkex.com.hk/-/media/HKEX-Market/News/Market-Consultations/Before2005/corporate-governance-issues.pdf?la=en [https://perma.cc/D3RR-E3VV] [hereinafter
HKEX CONSULTATION PAPER 2002].
37
Jang Hyuk Yeo, Kyung Chun Kim & Ho Joon Moon, Lee & Ko, Corporate
Governance
in
South
Korea,
LEXOLOGY
(July
5,
2019),
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=a48c6ebf-af0b-48f5-80ea-85ea920e8313
[https://perma.cc/UV55-5G83].
38
Kaisha-hō [Companies Act], Law No. 86 of 2005, art. 316 (Japan); Sean McGinty &
David Green, What Shareholders in Japan Say about Director Pay: Does Article 361 of
Japan’s Companies Act Matter?, 13 ASIAN J. COMP. L. 87, 88–89 (2018).
39
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Gongsifa (中华人民共和国公司法) [Company Law
of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s
Cong., Oct. 26, 2018, effective Oct. 26, 2018), art. 38(2); Lin Lin, Regulating Executive
Compensation in China: Problems and Solutions, 32 J.L. & COM. 207, 247 (2014).
40
DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 16 (1990).
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their firms.41 The distribution of power within the firm amongst the
principal players within the corporation—shareholders, managers
and employees—are thus affected by their interaction with the state’s
political economy though political institutions, ideologies and
interest groups. 42 How each capitalist economy’s institutions of
political economy negotiate these contradictions within the existing
predilections of its corporate governance framework determines the
regulatory outcome.
A.

“Say On Pay” and the Disruption of the Traditional
Corporate Governance Model

The economic disruption brought by the period of neo-liberal
globalization leading to the global financial crisis and its fallout has
led to the disruption of the traditional corporate governance model.
“Say on pay” has come at a time when a fundamental reconfiguration
of the corporate governance model is under way in many jurisdictions,
largely as a reaction to the alleged failure of corporate governance at
financial institutions in the run-up to the global financial crisis and
partly due to political overreaction from populist pressures in the
aftermath. Many aspects of these reforms remain contentious, and
their efficacy and implications are not completely understood. As
Bainbridge states, “say on pay” is “part of the ‘disintegrating erosion’
of particular exceptions,” by which “director primacy is slowly being
undermined.” 43 The board’s traditional prerogative to decide on
executive remuneration is a consequence of what is a de jure
“shareholder primary” model but a de facto “director primacy” model
that exists in many common law jurisdictions, including the US,
Singapore and Hong Kong, insofar as the board is charged with the
default responsibility of managing the business and operations of the
company. 44 This primacy accorded to managerial power had
41

Mark J. Roe & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Introduction, in CONVERGENCE AND PERSISTENCE
IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 1, 2–3 (Jeffrey N. Gordon & Mark J Roe eds., 2004).
42
Mark J. Roe & Massimiliano Vatiero, Corporate Governance and Its Political
Economy, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE 56, 57 (Jeffrey N.
Gordon & Wolf-Georg Ringe eds., 2018).
43
STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AFTER THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
135 (2012) (quoting Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928)).
44
For example, Section 141(a) of the Delaware General Corporation Law states that
the “business and affairs of every corporation . . . shall be managed by or under the board of
directors, except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter or in its certificate of
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coincided with the expansion of globalization and the retreat of the
state in its involvement with private markets and economic
governance in the preceding decades. Competition for increasingly
mobile capital has forced the state to create an attractive pro-investor
environment through pro-business labor laws and a permissible tax
and regulatory system.45
1. “Say on pay” and Shareholder Empowerment
Modern corporate governance theory credits Berle and Means
with tracing the problem of the risk of corporate opportunism arising
from the ceding of control by shareholders to professional managers
over the operations of public corporations. This “produces a
condition where the interests of owner and of ultimate manager may,
and often do, diverge, and where many of the checks which formerly
operated to limit the use of power disappear.” 46 In this context, the
shift towards shareholder power through the spate of “say on pay”
reforms are representative of the broader movement toward greater
shareholder democracy, which shareholder activists in the US have
long lobbied for to ensure better alignment between shareholder and
managerial interests.47 The OECD Principles, thus, state:
Shareholders also have an interest in how
remuneration and company performance are linked
when they assess the capability of the board and the
incorporation” (8 Del. C. 1953). Similarly, the Singapore Companies Act provides that “[t]he
business of a company shall be managed by, or under the direction or supervision of, the
directors” (Cap. 50, Rev. Ed. 2006), § 157A(1)). Hong Kong’s Model Articles for Public
Companies states that “the business and affairs of the company are managed by the directors,
who may exercise all the powers of the company” subject to the Companies Ordinance and
the articles. See Companies (Model Articles) Notice, L.N. 77 (2013), B2217, §2(1) (H.K.),
https://www.elegislation.gov.hk/hk/2013/ln77!en [https://perma.cc/5YVK-P6NC].
45
Richard W. Carney & Michael A. Witt, The Role of the State in Asian Business
Systems, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ASIAN BUSINESS SYSTEMS 538, 539 (Michael A.
Witt & Gordon Reddings eds., 2014).
46
ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY 6 (1933). See ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES
OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 574–575 (1776) (noting that “[t]he directors of such companies,
however, being the managers rather of other people’s money than of their own, it cannot
well be expected, that they should watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with which
the partners in a private co-partnership frequently watch over their own”).
47
Fabrizio Ferri, Say on Pay, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON SHAREHOLDER POWER 319,
322 (Jennifer G. Hill & Randall S. Thomas eds., 2015).
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qualities they should seek in nominees for the board.
The different forms of say-on-pay (binding or
advisory vote, ex ante and/or ex post, board members
and/or key executives covered, individual and/or
aggregate compensation, compensation policy and/or
actual remuneration) play an important role in
conveying the strength and tone of shareholder
sentiment to the board.48
Apart from the adoption of “say on pay,” recent US
developments include the controversial reforms of proxy access to
give shareholders stronger rights in the nomination of directors in
contested board elections and the increasing use by institutional
investors of private ordering as a “self-help” mechanism to attain
stronger participatory rights. This has shifted the dynamic between
boards and shareholders, which are increasingly engaged in what Hill
labels “private ordering combat.”49 Prior to the advent of “say on
pay,” executive compensation had previously been viewed as a
fiduciary duty problem, but was reinterpreted as an issue of
misalignment of managerial and shareholder interests. Under this
paradigm, pay-for-performance became a self-executing corporate
governance solution to a corporate governance problem to incentivize
management to align its interests with those of shareholders and to
maximize shareholder value. 50 The US—which has traditionally
accorded shareholders with the weakest decision rights amongst
common law jurisdictions—thus became the forerunner in actively
encouraging incentive compensation plans such as stock option
plans.51 While this was considered to be an economically efficient
solution under an “optimal contracting approach,” Bebchuk and Fried
48

OECD PRINCIPLES 2015, supra note 32, at 22.
Jennifer G. Hill, The Trajectory of American Corporate Governance: Shareholder
Empowerment and Private Ordering Combat, 2019 U. ILL. L. REV. 507, 509, 530 (2019).
Cheffins argues, however, that while shareholder passivity may be less common than before,
it is important not to overstate the extent to which managerial discretion will continue to be
circumscribed in the foreseeable future: BRIAN R. CHEFFINS, THE PUBLIC COMPANY
TRANSFORMED 344–46 (2018).
50
Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, CEO Incentives: It’s Not How Much You Pay,
But How, HARV. BUS. REV. (May–June 1990), https://hbr.org/1990/05/ceo-incentives-itsnot-how-much-you-pay-but-how [https://perma.cc/J8UD-NLH2].
51
John Armour et al., The Basic Governance Structure: The Interests of Shareholders
as a Class, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW—A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL
APPROACH 50, 66 (Reinier Kraakman et al. eds., 2017).
49
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subsequently argued that such an approach was untenable as
managerial power and rent extraction are likely to have an important
influence on the design of compensation arrangements and the
dilution of shareholder value, not least because of the risk of board
capture which militates against the chances of arm’s length
bargaining. 52
On this basis, executive compensation is a
manifestation of, rather than a solution to, the agency problem. 53 This
view was relied upon by the House of Representatives in 2007 in
enacting the Dodd-Frank Act, which introduced “say on pay” in the
US in 201154. The structuring of executive compensation was thus
reconceptualized post-financial crisis, when it was recognized that
there were inherent problems with pay-for-performance as a means
of aligning managers with the longer-term interests of shareholders.
Share options were deemed to have an asymmetrical risk profile, with
the incentives created by share-based payments varying significantly
depending on factors such as the vesting periods and prices, which
could lead to either excessive risk taking or risk aversion. 55 In an
empirical study by Geiler and Renneboog, many remuneration
agreements were found to be ineffective and promoted managerial
self-dealing and profit skimming. 56 Singapore, amongst other
jurisdictions, was cited as subject to a high risk of skimming and less
efficient remuneration contracting due to the high levels of variable
pay and comparably weak disclosure standards. 57
However, a conflicting image of shareholders pervades much
of contemporary US corporate law scholarship on “say on pay,”
which remains highly controversial. Bainbridge, for example, argues
that “say on pay” reforms are counterproductive as effective
corporate governance requires that decision-making authority be
52
LUCIAN A. BEBCHUK & JESSE M. FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE
UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 23–44 (2004). See also Marianne
Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are CEOs Rewarded For Luck? The Ones Without
Principals Are, 116 QUART. J. ECON. 901, 903–929 (2001) (using a “skimming model” and
finding that CEO “pay-for-luck” is as much as pay-for-performance especially in poorly
governed firms).
53
Ferri, Say on Pay, supra note 47, at 330.
54
H.R. REP. NO. 110-88, at 3–5 (2007).
55
OECD, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE BOARD PRACTICES: INCENTIVES AND GOVERNING
RISKS 37 (2011), https://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/49081438.pdf [https://perma.cc/DH4YLNP5].
56
Philipp Geiler & Luc Renneboog, Managerial Compensation: Agency Solution or
Problem, 11 J. CORP. L. STUD. 99, 138 (2011).
57
Id. at 125.
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vested in a small, discrete central board rather than in a large, diffuse
shareholder electorate, given the information asymmetries and
collective action problems that lead most shareholders to be rationally
apathetic. 58 Gordon also cautions that the burden of scrutinizing
executive pay at thousands of corporations particularly by
institutional investors would lead to outsourcing of voting decisions
to proxy advisors, which in turn would promote “one size fits all”
standardized guidelines that would hurt firm value.59 Consistent with
the concern of investor short-termism, former Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court of Delaware Strine states that increasing shareholder
power would leave boards increasingly subject to the “immediate
whims of stockholders.” 60 “Say on pay” may also serve as a
shareholder vote on the company’s short-term share performance
rather than on its long-term value.61 Such concerns still persist as the
effects of “say on pay” reforms still remain inconclusive to date.
2. “Say on pay” and Stakeholder Influence
Perhaps the biggest shift in the corporate governance model,
in which “say on pay” may be placed in the broader context, is not
the shift from “managerial capitalism” to “shareholder capitalism,”
but the growing trend toward a form of “accountable,” “collective”
or “enlightened” capitalism insofar as broader non-shareholder
stakeholder interests are increasingly taken into account in corporate
decision-making. 62
In 2015, the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) adopted a final rule pushed by labor unions
pursuant to section 953(b) of the Dodd-Frank Act, which requires
public companies to disclose the ratio of the compensation of its chief
executive officer (CEO) to the median compensation of its employees

58

Stephen M. Bainbridge, “Say on Pay” Justified?, 32 REGULATION 42, 47 (2009).
Jeffrey N. Gordon, Say On Pay; Cautionary Notes On The U.K. Experience And The
Case For Shareholder Opt-In, 46 HARV. J. LEGIS. 323, 325, 353 (2009).
60
Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Dangers of Denial: The Need for a Clear-Eyed Understanding
of the Power and Accountability Structure Established by the Delaware General
Corporation Law, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 761,787–88, 792 (2015).
61
Jill Fisch et al., Is Say on Pay All About Pay? The Impact of Firm Performance, 8
HARV. BUS. L. REV. 101 (2018).
62
What Companies Are For, THE ECONOMIST (Aug. 22, 2019),
https://www.economist.com/leaders/2019/08/22/what-companies-are-for
[https://perma.cc/N73W-TE6M].
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from 2018 unless excluded.63 This shift towards a more stakeholderoriented approach has arisen as the pursuit of shareholder value is
increasingly perceived to have produced negative economic
outcomes, including the surge in income inequality, depressing
wages and a fall in workers’ share in firm value, which have
contributed to a decline in social mobility.64 In this regard, the SEC
noted that, the pay ratio disclosure “provides an informational benefit
to shareholders in their say-on-pay voting.” 65 The rule may also be
understood as an attempt to assist workers in their bargaining
positions in wage negotiations rather than as a strict metric for
measuring corporate performance. 66 Such developments challenge
the traditional de jure “shareholder primary” model characteristic of
companies in common law jurisdictions such as the US and the UK,
as opposed to the stakeholder model more prevalent in civil law
jurisdictions in continental Europe. 67
Previously, corporate governance was viewed predominantly
as the mechanism of the ordering of private interests through the
“legal fiction” of the corporation, “which serves as a nexus for a set
of contracting relationships” 68 through corporate hierarchies, as
argued by neo-institutional economists, 69 that was structured in a
63
SEC, Pay Ratio Disclosure, 17 C.F.R. Parts 229 & 249 (2015),
https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2015/33-9877.pdf [https://perma.cc/8G56-MPR5].
64
Id. at 178.
65
Id. at 175–76.
66
John Armour et al., The Basic Governance Structure: Minority Shareholders and
Non-Shareholder Constituencies, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW—A COMPARATIVE
AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 80, 89, 94 (Reinier Kraakman et al. eds., 2017).
67
Marina Martynova & Luc Renneboog, An International Corporate Governance
Index, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 97, 114 (Douglas Michael
Wright et al. eds., 2013). The “shareholder primacy” model posits that as shareholders are
the primary beneficiaries of the company, directors should exercise their duties in the
shareholders’ interest to maximize shareholder value. In contrast, the stakeholder model
requires directors to take into account not only shareholders’ interests, but the interests of
other stakeholders which may affect or be affected by the company, including employees,
creditors, customers, suppliers and the wider community. See Shelley Marshall & Ian
Ramsay, Corporate Purpose, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE CORPORATION 168, 169
(Thomas Clarke, et al. eds., 2019) (discussing the “shareholder primacy” model and the
stakeholder model as an alternative).
68
Michael Jensen & William Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 310 (1976), which drew on
Armen Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic
Organization, 21 AER 777 (1972).
69
OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS,
MARKETS AND RELATIONAL CONTRACTING (1985) 68–84. See Ronald H. Coase, The Nature
of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 388–89 (1937) (arguing that the distinguishing characteristic
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preferably “non-interventionist” framework of legal rules. 70 The
financial crisis, however, upended such assumptions that
underpinned corporate governance as critics argued that shareholder
value in the limited sense and private ordering might not in fact be
the best means of promoting efficiency and corporate responsibility,
and the mechanisms used to ensure management accountability might
not have been effective as previously thought. 71 The steep rises in
executive compensation and income inequality witnessed during the
earlier winner-takes-all capitalist culture have been welldocumented. 72 Entity shielding, coupled with the separation of
ownership and control, in a limited liability corporation were
understood to have produced agency costs by increasing conflicts, not
simply between shareholders and managers, but also between
shareholders and broader stakeholders, by providing a vehicle for
externalizing the costs of corporate plundering to involuntary
creditors.73 The risk of opportunism and rent-seeking by managers
though excessive executive compensation thus came at the expense
of not just shareholders but creditors and employees as well, affecting
social welfare as a whole.74 In the wake of the financial crisis, there
was broad concern that by tying executive compensation to shortterm returns, remuneration packages in financial institutions had
contributed to the system’s collapse by encouraging managers to take
excessive risks from a social standpoint, which contributed to the
moral hazard of the state bailout of failing banks. Bebchuk has thus
of the firm is “the supersession of the price mechanism” which is replaced with “vertical”
integration or the power of the “entrepreneur-coordinator,” who directs the allocation of
corporate resources).
70
Peer Zumbansen, Governance: An Interdisciplinary Perspective, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF GOVERNANCE 84, 91 (David Levi-Faur ed., 2012). See John C. Coffee Jr., The
Political Economy Of Dodd-Frank: Why Financial Reform Tends To Be Frustrated And
Systemic Risk Perpetuated, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1019, 1024–25 (2012).
71
See generally P.M. Vasudev & Susan Watson, Introduction, in CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE AFTER THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 1, 1–5 (P.M. Vasudev & Susan Watson eds.,
2012) (giving an overview of corporate governance practices following the financial crisis).
72
See generally Lucian Bebchuk & Yaniv Grinstein, The Growth of Executive Pay, 21
OXF. REV. ECON. POL’Y 283 (2005) (examining the growth of US executive pay during 19932003).
73
Edward B. Rock, Adapting to the New Shareholder-Centric Reality, 161 U. PA. L.
REV. 1907, 1917–26 (2013).
74
See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers’ Pay, 98 GEO. L.J.
247, 274–75 (2010) (explaining that corporate governance reforms aimed at aligning
executive pay arrangements with the interests of banks’ common shareholders are not
socially desirable).
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argued that enhanced regulation of remuneration in financial
institutions is justified on the basis of moral hazard considerations,
not least because systemic failure of such institutions imposes
substantial costs on taxpayers.75
Others like Lipton, however, argue that it was shareholder
pressure that led to short-termism in the first place.76 Shareholders
were blamed in the Walker Review in the UK for acquiescing in or
encouraging poor board practices to boost returns on equity, which
“was not necessarily irrational from the standpoint of the immediate
interests of shareholders who, in the leveraged limited liability
business of a bank, receive all of the potential upside whereas their
downside is limited to their equity stake, however much the bank
loses overall in a catastrophe.” 77 As Coffee argues, institutional
shareholders, being diversified and having limited liability, are less
risk adverse than managers about corporate insolvency. To “correct”
the managerial tendency toward risk aversion, shareholders might
have been willing to accept even imperfect compensation structures
to induce managers into accepting greater risk. 78
Corporate governance reforms post-crisis have therefore been
premised on the need to align managerial preferences with not simply
the interests of shareholders but broader stakeholders. This, however,
creates a potential tension between this broader, public approach and
the focus on shareholder power under the “say on pay” reforms. 79
Consequently, the regulation of executive remuneration and
corporate governance in general has evolved to a focal point of public
interest through increasing political pressure exerted on the
75
Id. at 255–74; Lucian A. Bebchuk, How to Fix Bankers’ Pay, 139, DAEDALUS 52, 53
(2010);
Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., The Wages of Failure: Executive Compensation at Bear Stearns
and Lehman 2000–2008, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 257, 273–76 (2010).
76
Martin Lipton, The Proposed “Shareholder Bill of Rights Act of 2009”, HARV. L.
SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG.
(May
12,
2009)
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2009/05/12/the-proposed-shareholder-bill-of-rights-act-of2009 [https://perma.cc/ACM2-4D3J].
77
SIR DAVID WALKER, A REVIEW OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN UK BANKS AND
OTHER FINANCIAL INDUSTRY ENTITIES: FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS 71–72 (HM Treasury
2009),
https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/www.hmtreasury.gov.uk/d/walker_review_261109.pdf [https://perma.cc/CWB3-YBYK].
78
Coffee, The Political Economy Of Dodd-Frank, supra note 70, at 1052–53.
79
Jennifer G. Hill, Regulating Executive Remuneration After the Global Financial
Crisis: Common Law Perspectives, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON EXECUTIVE PAY 219, 233
(Randall S. Thomas and Jennifer G. Hill eds., 2012).
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corporation from broader corporate stakeholders (or “outsiders”)
through the invocation of broader societal interests.80
B.

Varieties of Capitalism and Regulatory Choices

This brings into question whether overpaid managers are a
distinctly American or Western problem. While CEO pay levels in
the US notoriously outpace the rest of the world, this is arguably a
common corporate governance problem faced by many advanced
economies, including Singapore and Hong Kong. According to the
Bloomberg Global CEO Index 2017, the highest paid CEOs may be
found in the following countries and regions in the following order:
US, Switzerland, Netherlands, UK, Canada, Germany, Australia,
Spain, Hong Kong and Singapore. According to data compiled by
Bloomberg, the return on equity for Singapore shareholders from
2009 to 2016 at large companies for every thousand dollars paid to a
director is just 0.5%, which trailed the US and UK (at 0.8% and 1.5%
respectively).81 A study of the annual reports of 541 listed companies
on the SGX observed weak pay-for-performance sensitivity between
Singapore CEOs’ remuneration and corporate profitability, with 21%
paying bonuses despite incurring losses and 32% paying larger
bonuses when the firm’s profits had declined. The same study also
found that unlike US companies, only 11% of the companies
surveyed utilized long-term incentive plans as part of total executive
compensation.82 A similar study of the annual reports of 233 Hong
Kong listed firms also found weak pay-for-performance alignment,
with only 15% of the companies surveyed utilizing long-term
incentive plans to incentivize CEOs to act in the firm’s long-term
80
See BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, STATEMENT ON THE PURPOSE OF A CORPORATION (2019),
https://opportunity.businessroundtable.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/BRT-Statementon-the-Purpose-of-a-Corporation-with-Signatures-1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LQB2-5RCP].
Moving away from shareholder primacy, the “corporate purpose” has been redefined by the
influential Business Roundtable in its new Statement on the Purpose of a Corporation signed
by 181 CEOs, who have committed to deliver value for the benefit of all stakeholders—
customers, employees, suppliers, communities and shareholders.
81
Andy Mukherjee, Singapore Boards Are Killing Value, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 8, 2016,
12:00 AM) https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2016-04-08/singapore-boards-arekilling-value [https://perma.cc/56BX-ACKM].
82
Korn Ferry Report: Pay Flat, Long-Term Incentives Utilization Low For Singapore
CEO’s, KORN FERRY (Sept. 13, 2017), https://www.kornferry.com/press/korn-ferry-reportpay-flat-long-term-incentives-utilization-low-for-singapore-ceos [https://perma.cc/2EHR9R6R].
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interest. 83 According to the Hong Kong Confederation of Trade
Unions, income inequality between corporate managers and frontline
employees is also widening.84 One would argue from conventional
theory that the liberalization of capital markets should serve as a force
for regulatory convergence. 85 On this premise, regulators in
Singapore and Hong Kong—as developed financial hubs competing
for listings—should support robust financial markets by taking heed
of shareholder interests and ensuring that the corporate and securities
legal framework minimizes the inefficient allocation of corporate
resources through misaligned executive remuneration.
Yet,
notwithstanding the broad similarities in the corporate governance
frameworks with listed companies in the US and the UK, the apparent
regulatory inertia in adopting “say on pay” reforms in Singapore and
Hong Kong calls for a deeper examination of their underlying
institutional factors. It also calls into question the often-criticized
“law matters” hypothesis that argued that common law jurisdictions
provide stronger shareholder protection than civil law countries,
which contributed to more developed capital markets and strong
economic growth, in view of the spate of “say on pay” reforms in the
latter particularly the amended Shareholder Rights Directive II
introduced in the European Union.86
In this regard, the “Varieties of Capitalism” theory sets out a
broad framework within which different models of corporate
governance may be analyzed. Firms may be seen as manifestations
of their managers behind the corporate veil seeking to exploit
“dynamic capabilities” and overcome coordination problems through
the firm’s relationships with its primary financiers—shareholders—
and broader stakeholders, particularly employees. In liberal market
economies (LMEs), firms coordinate their endeavors primarily
83

Benjamin Robertson, Performance Not A Factor In Hong Kong CEO Pay Scale,
Study Finds, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (Jan. 24, 2014, 2:19 AM),
https://www.scmp.com/business/companies/article/1412167/performance-not-factor-hongkong-ceo-pay-scale-study-finds [https://perma.cc/4CKH-QSY9].
84
Jada Nagumo, Asia’s Highest Paid CEOs Trump US Execs In Pay Rankings, NIKKEI
ASIAN REVIEW, (Dec. 19, 2018), https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Business-trends/Asia-shighest-paid-CEOs-trump-US-execs-in-pay-rankings [https://perma.cc/JTT7-N2VB].
85
MATHIAS M. SIEMS, CONVERGENCE IN SHAREHOLDER LAW 327–335 (2008).
86
Thomas & van der Elst, supra note 1, at 658; Rafael La Porta et al., Legal
Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. FINANCE. 1131, 1132, 1137–39 (1997); Rafael La
Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POLIT. ECON. 1113, 1139 (1998). See also Holger
Spamann, The “Antidirector Rights Index” Revisited, 23 THE REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES
467, 483 (2010) (critiquing the “law matters” theory).
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through hierarchies and competitive market arrangements, while in
coordinated market economies (CMEs), firms rely more heavily on
non-market relations supported by public and private regulatory
arrangements.87 This broadly corresponds with the Anglo-American
common law shareholder primacy model and the continental
European civil law stakeholder-oriented model. 88 A further
important leitmotif in the “Varieties of Capitalism” literature is the
influence of path dependent complementarities in each capitalist
model. Each model’s institutions evolve from the initial status quo
in a path dependent manner to a “coordinated structure of
complementary institutions driven by choices based on
supermodularity and complementarities,” which shape the likelihood
and nature of change for future institutions.89
A key characteristic of corporate governance, as observed by
Bebchuk and Roe, is its embeddedness in domestic legal systems, in
particular, in patterns of corporate ownership and interest group
dynamics. In consequence, notwithstanding the internationalization
of “global governance” standards, the rate and extent of convergence
of legal reforms are constrained by the forces of path dependency
along two distinct dimensions which are mutually reinforcing. 90 First,
from an efficiency perspective, initial conditions or “institutional
complementarities” in a particular system, along with sunk adaptive
costs, network externalities, endowment effects, and multiple optima,
can lead the system of political economy and its corporate structures
down a specific path. 91 Second, the initial rules and corporate
structures would have had distributional effects affecting the
resources of incumbents in the political process. 92 Existing corporate
structures and institutional complementarities, which have developed
to adapt to these structures, determine the relative efficiency of the

87

HALL & SOSKICE, supra note 16, at 8.
Sigurt Vitols, Varieties of Corporate Governance: Comparing Germany and the UK,
in VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM: THE INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF COMPARATIVE
ADVANTAGE 337–360 (Peter A. Hall & David Soskice eds., 2001).
89
Ronald J. Gilson, From Corporate Law to Corporate Governance, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE 3, 13 (Jeffery N. Gordon & Wolf-Georg
Ringe eds., 2018).
90
Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence of Corporate
Ownership and Governance, 52 STAN. L. REV. 127, 130–31 (1999).
91
Id. at 153.
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Id. at 157–59; ROE & GORDON, supra note 41, at 13.
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set of rules to be adopted and maintained. 93 This favors the status
quo, creating rents that incumbents would fight to preserve, making
it difficult to reform existing institutions to conform to the
“international” model by increasing the transition costs of doing so. 94
In this regard, an empirical study suggests that managers were not
merely passive rule-takers of regulatory reforms and had previously
lobbied rule-makers to avoid fuller disclosure of their compensation
through the mandatory expensing of stock option compensation due
to concerns about public scrutiny of their compensation. 95
The structural differences in the institutional political
economy between LMEs and CMEs would suggest different
regulatory strategies to resolve the issue of overpaid executives and
the market failure of social inequality. In this respect, one would
think that LMEs would rely more heavily on market forces to regulate
executive remuneration. This, however, would not adequately
explain the adoption of “say on pay” reforms by the US and UK
(LMEs) and continental European states such as Germany and France
(CMEs). At the same time, “say on pay” is consistent with a
shareholder-centric approach toward corporate governance that is
prevalent in LMEs. The thrust of “say on pay” reforms is less of
direct government intervention in executive compensation than to
reinforce market discipline by enabling better coordination between
private actors insofar as shareholders, as opposed to the state, will
have a say on the company’s executive remuneration.96
At face value, Singapore and Hong Kong are arguably LMEs.
In international rankings, Hong Kong and Singapore are ranked the
highest in terms of economic freedom 97 and the lowest in terms of the
burden of government regulation, and they are among the highest in
pay and productivity and flexibility of wage determination in the
labor market, ahead of the US and the UK.98 Yet, there exists a wide
93

Bebchuk & Roe, supra note 90, at 131, 166.
Gilson, supra note 89, at 9–14.
95
Patricia M. Dechow et al., Economic Consequences of Accounting for Stock-Based
Compensation, 34 J. ACCT. RES. 1, 18–19 (1996).
96
See JONATHAN MACEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: PROMISES KEPT, PROMISES
BROKEN 202–04, 275–76 (2008). Despite his criticism of shareholder democracy, “say on
pay” may be seen to be a market-based mechanism, which serves to encourage executives
to keep their promises to shareholders as Macey advocates.
97
THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION, 2019 INDEX OF ECONOMIC FREEDOM: COUNTRY
RANKINGS (2019), https://www.heritage.org/index/ranking [https://perma.cc/MQ6T-76Y9].
98
WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, supra note 26, at 266–68, 506–08.
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spectrum of regulatory states and classifying them as either LMEs or
CMEs does not does not provide us with sufficient granularity and
precision in evaluating their institutional landscape and the patterns
of interaction amongst actors in the political economy. It is necessary
to regard the regulatory state as a dynamic as opposed to a static
construct; failure to do so risks oversimplifying regulation, which is
often a context-dependent socio-political phenomena as much as it is
a legal one. 99 Other scholars have subsequently developed and
refined the “Varieties of Capitalism” theory with different
typologies.100 The “Varieties of Capitalism” theory, thus, only takes
us halfway—it explains how different regulatory states came to their
present form but does not fully address how different regulatory states
may respond to similar challenges differently, 101 nor does not account
for new governance patterns particularly in Asia. 102 For example, is
Singapore’s state-driven capitalism or Hong Kong’s close-knit
corporate community an LME or CME (or a hybrid)?

III.

OVERVIEW OF “SAY ON PAY” REFORMS
A.

United States

In response to public concerns about the financial crisis in
2008, the US Congress placed “say on pay” on its legislative agenda
and passed the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008. It
required bailout recipients under the Troubled Asset Relief Program
(TARP) to provide their shareholders with an advisory vote on the
remuneration of the corporation’s executives in exchange for
financial assistance. It also provided for limitations on remuneration,
a prohibition on golden parachute payments, and claw-backs for

99
See Karen Yeung, The Regulatory State, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF REGULATION
64, 75–6 (Robert Baldwin et al. eds., 2010).
100
See e.g. ALAN DIGNAM & MICHAEL GALANIS, THE GLOBALIZATION OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE 45–46 (2009); PETER A. GOUREVITCH AND JAMES SHINN, POLITICAL POWER
AND CORPORATE CONTROL 54–56 (2007) (both discussing the “Varieties of Capitalism”
theory).
101
Gilson, supra note 89, at 13–14.
102
See generally Michael A. Witt & Gordon Redding, Asian Business Systems:
Implications and Perspectives for Comparative Business Systems and Varieties of
Capitalism Research, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ASIAN BUSINESS SYSTEMS 668, 684
(2014).
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senior executive officers of TARP recipients. 103 This was extended
and made mandatory for public companies by the Dodd–Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 104 which was
implemented in January 2011 by the SEC. Specifically, the SEC
required public companies to conduct a shareholder advisory vote to
approve the remuneration of the company’s named executive officers
at least once every three years, and conduct a separate shareholder
advisory vote at least once every six years to determine how regularly
the “say on pay” vote should be held. In addition, companies
soliciting votes to approve merger or acquisition transactions are
required to disclose certain “golden parachute” compensation
arrangements and, in certain circumstances, to conduct a separate
shareholder advisory vote to approve the arrangements. 105 The
Dodd-Frank Act also provided for the independence of compensation
committees and compensation consultants; the recovery of excess
incentive-based compensation following the material noncompliance with any financial reporting requirement; and enhanced
disclosure requirements in respect of employee or director hedging,
the relationship between executive compensation and the issuer’s
financial performance, and the ratio of CEO compensation to the
median compensation of employees, as discussed earlier. 106
B.

United Kingdom

The UK has historically had the most rigorous set of
governance requirements with respect to executive compensation.
Since 2002, listed companies have been required to submit a
Directors’ Remuneration Report to the advisory vote of

103
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110–343, § 5221, 122
Stat. 3765 (2008), https://www.congress.gov/110/plaws/publ343/PLAW-110publ343.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ASM2-4RRW].
104
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111–203,
§ 951, 124 Stat. 1899 (2010), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PLAW111publ203/pdf/PLAW-111publ203.pdf [https://perma.cc/UM3W-DZNR].
105
SEC Shareholder Approval of Executive Compensation and Golden Parachute
Compensation,
17
C.F.R.
Parts
229,
240,
249
(2011),
https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2011/33-9178.pdf [https://perma.cc/DY38-ZV77].
106
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111–203,
§§ 952–955, 124 Stat. 1899 (2010), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PLAW111publ203/pdf/PLAW-111publ203.pdf [https://perma.cc/UM3W-DZNR].
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shareholders. 107 Concerns were raised about the efficacy of an
advisory vote, which led the UK government to legislate a binding
regime.108 In 2013, the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013
was passed, under which shareholders of quoted companies must
approve the directors’ remuneration policy by ordinary resolution at
least once every three years and all director payments, including
payment for loss of office, must be consistent with the policy or
approved by shareholders if otherwise.109
In a further shift towards a more stakeholder-oriented model,
the Companies (Miscellaneous Reporting) Regulations 2018 was
introduced, under which UK quoted companies with more than 250
UK employees would be required to publish the ratio of their CEO’s
total remuneration to the median (50th), the 25th and 75th quartile
pay remuneration of their UK employees in their directors’
remuneration reports. Such companies would also have to disclose
supporting information, including whether the median ratio is
consistent with the company’s wider employment policies. 110 The
revised Code of Corporate Governance 2018 further provides for
additional responsibilities for remuneration committees to review
workforce remuneration and the alignment of incentives and rewards
with culture, and take these factors into account when setting the
policy for executive director remuneration. 111 Most notably, to
encourage engagement with the workforce, it prescribes that the
company should either have a director appointed from the workforce,
a formal workforce advisory panel or a designated non-executive
director (or otherwise explain what alternative arrangements it has in
place and why it considers them to be effective). 112 Most recently,
the Companies (Directors’ Remuneration Policy and Directors’
Remuneration Report) Regulations 2019 extended the scope of the
107

The Directors’ Remuneration Report Regulations 2002, No. 1986 (Eng.),
https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2002/1986/made [https://perma.cc/NKG9-NZGH].
108
Thomas & van der Elst, supra note 1, at 668.
109
Enterprise
and
Regulatory
Reform
Act
2013,
c.
24
(Eng.),
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2013/24/contents/enacted
[https://perma.cc/Q78FDXLC].
110
Companies (Miscellaneous Reporting) Regulations 2018, No. 860 (Eng.),
https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2018/860/contents/made
[https://perma.cc/97QUCSQW].
111
FRC, UK CODE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2018), §§ 33, 40,
https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/88bd8c45-50ea-4841-95b0-d2f4f48069a2/2018-UKCorporate-Governance-Code-FINAL.PDF [https://perma.cc/2Z56-UB26].
112
Id. at § 5.
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UK’s existing executive pay framework to cover unquoted traded
companies as well as quoted companies.113
C.

Australia

A non-binding shareholder vote on the directors’
remuneration report was introduced in 2004 in Australia. 114
Following concerns that this did not provide shareholders with
sufficient power or incentives for companies to respond to
shareholder concerns, the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) was amended
after the financial crisis to provide for a new “two-strikes and reelection” process. 115 The “two-strikes” occur when a company’s
remuneration report receives a “no” vote twice in a row of 25% or
more of the shareholder votes cast on a resolution that the
remuneration report be adopted. This triggers a “spill resolution” to
be put to shareholders and if shareholders vote in favor of the spill
resolution, the company’s directors (other than the managing director)
would be required to stand for re-election within 90 days. 116
D.

European Union

“Say on pay” reforms have also been passed across Europe,
including France, the Netherlands, Germany, Sweden and
Belgium. 117 The amended Shareholder Rights Directive II, which
came into force in 2017, strengthens shareholder power over
management and seeks to facilitate long-term shareholder
engagement and encourage greater involvement of and oversight by
all stakeholders, in particular employees, as part of the company’s
113
Companies (Directors’ Remuneration Policy and Directors’ Remuneration Report)
Regulations 2019, No. 970 (Eng.),
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2019/970/contents/made
[https://perma.cc/N9FQWGVK].
114
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 250R (Austl.),
https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C2017C00328 [https://perma.cc/EL4R-YXJV].
115
Corporations Amendment (Improving Accountability on Director and Executive
Remuneration) Bill 2011 (Cth), Explanatory Memorandum Chapter 1 (Austl.),
https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C2011B00020/Explanatory%20Memorandum/Text
[https://perma.cc/LB92-M479].
116
Corporations Amendment (Improving Accountability on Director and Executive
Remuneration) Act 2011 (Cth) s 250V (Austl.),
https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C2011A00042 [https://perma.cc/X8GX-PTZF].
117
THOMAS & VAN DER ELST, supra note 1, at 658.
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corporate governance. In its preceding Green Paper consultation, the
European Commission made the case for greater shareholder
oversight of corporate remuneration policies by highlighting that
“[p]oor remuneration policies and/or incentive structures lead to
unjustified transfers of value from companies, their shareholders and
other stakeholders to executives”.118 Under the amended Directive,
each listed company in the European Union (EU) would be required
to put its remuneration policy for directors to a binding ex ante
shareholder vote at every material change and in any case at least
every four years, but member states may provide for the vote on
remuneration policy to be advisory.119 Companies would be allowed
to implement a remuneration policy which has been rejected by
shareholders, but would be required to submit a revised policy at the
subsequent general meeting. 120 The amended Directive also
enhanced company disclosure requirements to increase firm
transparency and director accountability, and to facilitate better
shareholder oversight over directors’ compensation.
The
remuneration policy must set out, inter alia, “how the pay and
employment conditions of employees of the company were taken into
account” in establishing the remuneration policy, how it contributes
to the “company’s business strategy and long-term interests and
sustainability,” and “criteria relating to corporate social responsibility”
for the award of variable compensation. 121 Companies are also
required to hold an advisory vote on its remuneration report, which
must set out the remuneration awarded in the past financial year to
individual directors, as well as a comparison with the “average
remuneration on a full-time equivalent basis of employees of the
company other than directors over at least the five most recent

118

Communication From The Commission To The European Parliament, The Council,
The European Economic And Social Committee And The Committee Of The Regions Action
Plan: European Company Law And Corporate Governance—A Modern Legal Framework
For More Engaged Shareholders And Sustainable Companies, COM(2012) 740 final 9 (Dec.
12,
2012),
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52012DC0740&from=EN [https://perma.cc/7QXE79JZ].
119
Directive 2017/828, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 May 2017
Amending Directive 2007/36/EC as Regards the Encouragement of Long-term Shareholder
Engagement,
O.J.
(L
132)
arts.
9a–9b,
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/en/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A32017L0828 [https://perma.cc/E5LA-WPNZ].
120
Id.
121
Id.
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financial years”. 122 Where the shareholders vote against the
remuneration report, boards would need to explain in their next
remuneration report how they have taken into account the shareholder
vote. As an alternative to a vote, member states may permit small
and medium-sized companies to submit the remuneration report only
for discussion in the annual general meeting instead. 123
E.

Singapore

In its review of the Singapore Code of Corporate Governance
last year, the Corporate Governance Council noted that the US, UK
and Australia had introduced “say on pay” reforms. It decided,
however, that “say on pay” was “not necessary in the Singapore
context at this point” and that the primary responsibility to decide on
compensation should rest with the Remuneration Committee and
board of directors, despite proponents arguing that it would facilitate
greater shareholder engagement.124 Instead, it considered that “it is
more important for companies to provide meaningful disclosures so
that stakeholders can understand the alignment in the level and
structure of remuneration to the companies’ long-term objectives,
business strategy and performance.” 125 Curiously, the OECD lists
Singapore as a jurisdiction with at least one “flexibility” mechanism
for “say on pay,” and in its 2019 Factbook, as having a requirement
for shareholder approval on remuneration policy under its listing
rules.126 In this regard, the SGX Mainboard Rules only requires listed
companies to disclose in its annual report the remuneration of
directors and key executives as recommended in the Code of
Corporate Governance, or otherwise disclose and explain any

122

Id.
Id.
124
MONETARY AUTHORITY OF SINGAPORE, CONSULTATION PAPER ON RECOMMENDATION
OF THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE COUNCIL 17–18 (2018), https://www.mas.gov.sg//media/MAS/Regulations-and-Financial-Stability/Regulatory-and-SupervisoryFramework/Corporate-Governance-of-Listed-Companies/Consultation-2018-Jan16/Consultation-paper-on-Corporate-Governance-Councils-recommendations.pdf
[https://perma.cc/C74C-H8NK].
125
Id.
126
OECD, FLEXIBILITY AND PROPORTIONALITY IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2018),
http://www.oecd.org/corporate/flexibility-and-proportionality-in-corporate-governance9789264307490-en.htm [https://perma.cc/GD5Y-QH7H]; OECD F ACTBOOK 2019, supra
note 1, at 165.
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deviation from the recommendation. 127 The Code of Corporate
Governance itself is not binding but applies on a comply-or-explain
basis. It provides that the board should develop director and
executive remuneration packages that are “appropriate and
proportionate to the sustained performance and value creation of the
company,” based on the recommendations of the Remuneration
Committee, the majority of whom are independent directors. The
company is also required to disclose in its annual report the names,
amounts and breakdown of remuneration of each director and the
CEO, and at least the top five key management personnel in bands no
wider than S$250,000 and in aggregate. 128 These disclosure
requirements were not made mandatory pursuant to the 2018 revision
of the code notwithstanding several studies which have shown that
these disclosure requirements are usually among the most poorly
complied provisions of the code.129 The revision, however, enhanced
the disclosure requirements and provided for the company to set out
in its annual report the names, relationship and remuneration in bands
no wider than S$100,000 of employees who are substantial
shareholders, or are immediate family members of a director, the
CEO or a substantial shareholder, and whose remuneration exceeds
S$100,000 during the year.130
Singapore, however, has a minimal form of “say on pay”:
director fees must be approved by an ordinary shareholder vote but
the salary paid to an executive director is usually left by the
constitution to the board to decide.131 Compensation for loss of office
or retirement by a director must also be approved by a shareholder
vote, but this does not include payments that are part of the director’s
remuneration package.132 In view of these requirements, the Steering
Committee, in its review of the Singapore Companies Act in 2011,
took the view that the then-existing requirement for a directors’ report,
including the requirement to disclose directors’ benefits therein was
of little value and unnecessary, and recommended its abolishment
127

SGX, Mainboard Rules, § 1207(12) (Sing.).
Code of Corporate Governance (6 August 2018), Principles 6–8 (Sing.).
129
Chua Wei Hwa, Remuneration Disclosures—Is “Comply-or-Explain” Enough?,
THE BUSINESS TIMES, (Mar. 8, 2018), https://www.businesstimes.com.sg/hub/boardroommatters/remuneration-disclosures-%E2%80%93-is-%E2%80%9Ccomply-orexplain%E2%80%9D-enough [https://perma.cc/HT5T-FU9J].
130
Code of Corporate Governance (6 August 2018), Provision 8.2 (Sing.).
131
Companies Act (Cap. 50, Rev. Ed. 2006), § 169 (Sing.).
132
Companies Act (Cap. 50, Rev. Ed. 2006), § 168 (Sing.).
128
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despite similar requirements in the UK and Australia. It also removed
the requirement for shareholder approval where the payment of
compensation to an executive director for termination of employment
does not exceed his base salary for the three preceding years. 133
F.

Hong Kong

Hong Kong is listed by the OECD in its 2019 Factbook as a
jurisdiction that does not require shareholder approval on board and
key executive remuneration. 134 Listed companies are instead
required to establish a Remuneration Committee, a majority of which
must be independent directors. 135 Under the Corporate Governance
Code, which applies on a comply-or-explain basis, the Remuneration
Committee is responsible for determining the remuneration packages
of individual executive directors and senior management, or making
recommendations to the board on their remuneration packages. 136
Unlike Singapore, however, Hong Kong provides for a stronger form
of “say on pay” and shareholder approval is required under the
Listing Rules for director service contracts exceeding three years, or
which require the company to give notice of more than one year or to
pay compensation or other payments exceeding one year’s
emoluments to terminate the contract. The Remuneration Committee
(or an independent board committee) is required to advise
shareholders on how to vote, and whether the terms are fair and
reasonable and in the interests of the shareholders.137 This rule was
introduced by the HKEX in 2004 in view of concerns about the lack
of scrutiny of excessive director remuneration that was not
sufficiently tied to corporate performance. At the same time, the
HKEX considered that it was inappropriate to impose a shareholder
approval requirement for the quantum of director remuneration per
133

MINISTRY OF FINANCE, CONSULTATION PAPER: REPORT OF THE STEERING COMMITTEE
REVIEW
OF
THE
COMPANIES
ACT
1–17
(2011),
https://www.mof.gov.sg/portals/0/data/cmsresource/public%20consultation/2011/Review%
20of%20Companies%20Act%20and%20Foreign%20Entities%20Act/Annex%20A%20SC
%20Report%20Complete%202.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y622-HM4W].
134
OECD FACTBOOK 2019, supra note 1, at 164. Cf. REFORM PRIORITIES IN ASIA, supra
note 14, at 117 (in which Hong Kong was previously incorrectly listed by the OECD in 2013
as a jurisdiction in which “the law or regulations provide for the approval of executive
directors’ compensation by shareholders”).
135
HKEX, Main Board Listing Rules, (2019) § 3.25 (H.K.).
136
Id. at Appendix 14, Principle B.
137
Id. at § 13.68.
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se.138 A disclosure-based approach instead was considered preferable
on the basis that “directors’ remuneration is essentially a commercial
decision of the issuer”, which “should have the flexibility to attract,
reward and motivate its directors and employees by compensation
packages that the board considers appropriate.” 139 While this rule
may have the effect as an indirect check on excessive managerial
compensation (in particular golden parachute payments), it does not
provide for the manner in which the director’s remuneration itself is
to be determined and approved under the service contract, nor does it
serve as a regular shareholder appraisal of the director’s remuneration
unlike a “say on pay” vote. In this regard, pursuant to the Model
Articles, the director’s remuneration under the service contract is
determined by the board, while his remuneration in respect of this
office as director is determined by the company at the annual general
meeting even though it is common for boards in Hong Kong to obtain
a shareholders’ mandate to authorize the board to decide on the
latter. 140 Under the disclosure-based approach, the Listing Rules
require that a listed company disclose in its financial statements
details of its directors’ remuneration on a named basis, along with the
remuneration of the five highest paid individuals in the company for
the financial year. 141 The Companies Ordinance also requires a
company to disclose in its financial statements details regarding
directors’ pay on a collective basis, 142 as well as to obtain
shareholders’ approval for certain payments for loss of office, and
unlike Singapore, for directors’ service contracts that may exceed
three years as well. 143 The issue of “say on pay” on executive
compensation was not considered during the consultations prior to
the new Companies Ordinance passed in 2012. 144
138

HKEX CONSULTATION PAPER 2002, supra note 36.
Id.
140
Paul Westover & Karen Lau, Corporate Governance and Directors’ Duties in Hong
Kong: Overview, PRACTICAL LAW (June 1, 2019). See Companies (Model Articles) Notice,
L.N. 77 (2013), B2243, §28(1) (H.K.), https://www.elegislation.gov.hk/hk/cap622H
[https://perma.cc/9VJ2-6LSC].
141
HKEX, MAIN BOARD LISTING RULES, (2019) at Appendix 16, § 24–25 (H.K.).
142
Companies Ordinance, (2013) Cap. 622, 1, § 383 (H.K.). See also Companies
(Disclosure of Information about Benefits of Directors) Regulation, L.N. 163 of 2013, § 4
(H.K.), https://www.elegislation.gov.hk/hk/cap622G (providing for disclosure of directors’
emoluments, retirement benefits, and “golden parachute” payments.)
143
Id. at §§ 521–523, 534.
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Stefan H.C. Lo, Corporate Governance and The New Companies Ordinance in Hong
Kong, 21 ASIA PAC. L. REV. 267, 296–297 (2013).
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CAPITALIST VARIATIONS IN INSTITUTIONS OF
POLITICAL ECONOMY

This article argues that regulatory variances in the “say on pay”
reforms adopted by various jurisdictions must be understood against
the backdrop of the distinctive institutional contexts from which they
emerged. Here, the basic features of the corporate model in listed
companies in Singapore and Hong Kong resemble those in the US
and UK—these include a one-tier board made up of executive and
non-executive, and independent directors elected by shareholders and
responsible for monitoring the management in the best interests of the
shareholders, and the presence of remuneration, nomination and audit
committees. There, however, the similarities end. It is argued that
the absence of “say on pay” reforms in Singapore and Hong Kong
may be attributed to broader institutional factors such as their
distinctive patterns of corporate ownership, the relative reticence of
institutional investors, the role of the state and ultimately the sociopolitical culture and ethos within a non-Western liberal democratic
framework.
A.

Managerial Power and Shareholding Patterns

As of 2019, the Anglo-American model of the diffuselyowned firm is not prevalent in Asia even with improvements in
minority shareholder protection. Instead, there is a proliferation of
different forms of ownership concentration, in particular family
ownership through cross-shareholdings and pyramidal structures, and
state ownership. 145 In contrast with the prevalence of dispersed
shareholdings in the US and the UK, whereby no single shareholder,
or affiliated group of shareholders, is capable of exercising control, 146
companies in Singapore and Hong Kong have a large concentration
of ownership. “Say on pay” is consequently less important as a
means of mobilizing shareholder opposition against high executive
145

Gordon, supra note 31, at 30–31.
Rafael La Porta et al., Corporate Ownership Around the World, 54 J. FINANCE 471,
492–3 (1999). Cf. Brian R. Cheffins, Does Law Matter? The Separation of Ownership and
Control in the United Kingdom, 30 J. LEG. STUD. 459, 460 (2001); John C. Coffee, Jr., The
Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of Law and the State in the Separation of Ownership
and Control, 111 YALE L.J. 1, 16–23, 80 (2001) (both arguing that the diverse structures of
corporate ownership in the UK and US respectively are in part due to forces exogenous to
corporate law).
146
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remuneration in Singapore and Hong Kong. As de facto control is
concentrated in the hands of block shareholders, which can
effectively monitor and discipline self-serving managers, agency
costs are lessened with less of a separation of firm ownership and
control.147 Legal controls on executive remuneration are, in turn, less
important and executive pay levels may be constrained more
effectively.148
In contrast, shareholder monitoring of executive remuneration
is less effective where shareholdings are dispersed in a Berle-Means
corporation as shareholders suffer from the collective action problem
with information and coordination costs, and are unlikely to see
substantial individual gains from a potential reduction in executive
pay.149 In this regard, dispersed ownership is traditionally cited as
the reason why performance pay was implemented in the first place
in order to promote alignment between managerial and shareholder
interests (at least in theory). However, the economic inefficiency of
setting executive remuneration arising from board capture in practice
in a dispersed ownership context is itself why “say on pay” was
subsequently introduced, as well as to resolve the collective action
problem faced by dispersed shareholders. 150
One may have a better understanding of the significance of
the introduction of “say on pay” reforms in the US when they are seen
in the historical context of US corporate governance. The historical
dispersed nature of ownership in US corporations and ambivalence
toward shareholder participation rights contributed to the primacy
accorded to managers in corporate decision-making. In comparison
with the more shareholder-centric UK and other common law models,
including Singapore and Hong Kong’s, US shareholders have
traditionally possessed far fewer corporate governance rights than
their foreign counterparts, where such rights are often guaranteed by
legislation.151 Under Delaware law, for example, shareholders have
restricted rights on calling special meetings, removing directors and
147
Mark J. Roe, Modern Politics and Ownership Separation, in CONVERGENCE AND
PERSISTENCE IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 252, 253 (Jeffrey N. Gordon & Mark J Roe eds.,
2004).
148
Thomas & van der Elst, supra note 1, at 711–13; Randall S. Thomas, Explaining The
International CEO Pay Gap: Board Capture Or Market Driven?, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1171,
1215 (2004).
149
Ferrarini & Ungureanu, supra note 5, at 344.
150
See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 52, at 23–52.
151
Hill, supra note 49, at 509.
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initiating charter amendments, which suggest that shareholder
interests are not equated with corporate interests in the way that they
are in the UK (or Singapore or Hong Kong). 152 US federal proxy
rules were historically less concerned with managerial agency costs
than the risk that a group of shareholders would gain control to the
detriment of the firm’s shareholders in general, which led to rules that
restrained coordination attempts amongst shareholders and
insurgents seeking to gain control through proxy contests. 153 The
traditionally dispersed retail-oriented pattern of shareholdings in US
corporations, Roe argues, is a product of its history of populist
politics, which led to policies purporting to fragment institutional
control of industrial enterprise. 154 This insulated much of board
activity from shareholder interference, rendering shareholders
“spectators” rather than “participants.” 155 Consequently, “say on pay”
was introduced to correct this imbalance between strong managerial
power and weak shareholder power and the consequent perceived
agency costs which led to excessive executive compensation. At the
same time, the historical nature and path dependence of “director
primacy” in the US also explains why such reforms are likely to
remain contentious in the US, along with broader reforms toward
shareholder empowerment and participation in corporate
governance.156
Singapore and Hong Kong challenge the presumption of the
dispersedly-held Berle-Means corporation as the zenith of efficiency
and the end of history.157 The power which block shareholders hold
is greater than what “say on pay” and other shareholder protection
regulation in the US and UK purport to confer on dispersed
shareholders, which are designed to overcome their collective action
152
CHRISTOPHER M. BRUNER, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE COMMON-LAW WORLD:
THE POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF SHAREHOLDER POWER 40–42 (2013)
153
SEC Rule 13d-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-5 (2008) (This includes SEC registration and
disclosure requirements for any 5% “group” of shareholders which agree to coordinate their
votes). See Armour et al., The Basic Governance Structure: The Interests of Shareholders
as a Class, supra note 51, at 61.
154
MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS 48-49 (1994); Armour et al.,
What is Corporate Law?, supra note 29, at 28.
155
BRUNER, supra note 152, at 38.
156
Id. See also Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of
Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 550–52 (2003).
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Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraackman, The End of History for Corporate Law in
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and Mark J. Roe eds., 2004).
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problem.158 This arguably accounts for the lack of traction of “say on
pay,” as with other American mechanisms for shareholder power.
Singapore and Hong Kong are similar insofar as public companies
are dominated by families and the state as controlling shareholders.
Both share a common recent trend towards greater shareholder
concentration than dispersal,159 with the recent introduction of dualclass share structures possibly perpetuating this further. 160 About 75%
of listed companies on the HKEX in 2012 had a dominant shareholder,
such as an individual/family or state-owned entity, which owned at
least 30% of the issued shares.161 Tracking ownership patterns in the
largest 200 publicly traded companies based on market capitalization,
Carney and Child found that 55.1% remained under family control in
2008, compared with 68.3% in 1996. 162 Another empirical study
found that the 10 wealthiest families in Hong Kong owned over 47%
of the total market capitalization of the HKEX in 2000. 163 It was also
found that 53% of all listed companies had one shareholder or one
family group of shareholders owning at least 50% of the issued
capital, with the board of directors owning at least a third of all shares
in over 85% of listed companies.164 Similarly, the majority of listed
companies in Singapore had a block shareholder of 15% or more of
issued shares in 2016.165 Amongst the 100 largest firms in Singapore
in 2007-2008, 69 are family-owned firms with the control block
158

See Wee & Puchniak, supra note 12, at 365–68.
DAVID C. DONALD, A FINANCIAL CENTRE FOR TWO EMPIRES: HONG KONG’S
CORPORATE, SECURITIES AND TAX LAWS IN ITS TRANSITION FROM BRITAIN TO CHINA 54–57
(2014); Luh Luh Lan & Umakanth Varottil, Shareholder Empowerment In Controlled
Companies: The Case Of Singapore, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON SHAREHOLDER POWER 572,
578 (Jennifer G. Hill & Randall S Thomas, 2015).
160
Singapore Details Rules for Offering Dual-Class Shares, Follows Hong Kong,
REUTERS (June 26, 2018, 6:24 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/sgxregulation/singapore-details-rules-for-offering-dual-class-shares-follows-hong-kongidUSL4N1TS3E3 [https://perma.cc/TY9S-M9EL].
161
OECD SURVEY 2017, supra note 13, at 5.
162
Richard W. Carney & Travers Barclay Child, Changes to the Ownership and Control
of East Asian Corporations Between 1996 and 2008: The Primacy of Politics, 107 J. FIN.
ECON. 494, 505 (2013). See Stijn, Claessens et al., The Separation of Ownership and Control
in East Asian Corporations, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 81, 106–108 (2000) (an empirical study finding
that as of 1996, 66.7% of Hong Kong’s public companies were family-owned, with corporate
assets held by the largest 15 families amounting to 84% of Hong Kong’s GDP, which was
higher than all the other countries studied).
163
S.S.M. Ho, Hong Kong System of Corporate Governance, in CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE AROUND THE WORLD 198, 210 (Ahmed Naciri ed., 2008).
164
Id.
165
OECD SURVEY 2017, supra note 13, at 6.
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holding an average percentage of shares of 69.52%.166 A separate
study with a larger sample size of 692 companies listed on the SGX
in 2010-2011 found that 421 companies (or 60.8% of the sample size)
comprised family-owned companies.167 It revealed that the top five
shareholders owned 65.9% of the family firm, compared to 62.7% in
a non-family firm.168 While shareholder protections Singapore and
Hong Kong are often ranked amongst the strongest in Asia, 169 the
persistence of concentrated ownership amongst families and the state
is a key reason why their corporate governance has been argued to
lag behind those of other high-income common law jurisdictions such
as the US, UK and Australia.170
In Hong Kong, there is also an increasing number of mainland
Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs). 171 Since 1993, Chinese
SOEs have listed “H-shares” in Hong Kong and, as of 2012, comprise
approximately 11% of the listed companies and over 20% of the
HKEX market capitalization. 172
Similarly, the Singapore
government maintains substantial ownership of corporatized SOEs
(i.e. government-linked companies (GLCs) and real estate investment
trusts) through its holding company, namely, Temasek Holdings, in
which it is the sole equity shareholder. 173 From 2008 to 2013, GLCs
accounted for 37% of the SGX’s market capitalization. 174 Block

166
Tan Lay Hong, Family-Owned Firms in Singapore: Legal Strategies for
Constraining Self-Dealing in Concentrated Ownership Structures, 23 SING. ACAD. LAW J.
890, 892 (2011).
167
DR MARLEEN DIELEMAN ET AL., SUCCESS AND SUCCESSION: A STUDY OF SGX-LISTED
FAMILY FIRMS 8 (2011),
https://bschool.nus.edu.sg/Portals/0/images/CGIO/Report/Asian%20Family%20Business%
20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/DG8M-MC5S].
168
Id.
169
ASIAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ASSOCIATION, CG WATCH 2018 3 (2018),
https://www.acga-asia.org/cgwatch-detail.php?id=362 [https://perma.cc/Z5L6-LH9G].
170
See Richard W. Carney, Singapore: Open State-Led Capitalism, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF ASIAN BUSINESS SYSTEMS 193, 200 (Michael A. Witt & Gordon Redding eds.,
2014).
171
S.H. Goo & Yu-Hsin Lin, Hong Kong, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN ASIA: A
COMPARATIVE APPROACH 151, 156 (Bruce Aronson & Joongi Kim eds., 2019).
172
DONALD, supra note 159, at 58–59 (2014).
173
Cheng-Han Tan et al., State-Owned Enterprises in Singapore: Historical Insights
Into a Potential Model for Reform. 28 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 61, 88–9 (2015). See also LINDA
LOW, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF A CITY-STATE REVISITED 378–399 (2006).
174
See ISABEL SIM, STEEN THOMSEN & GERARD YEONG, THE STATE AS SHAREHOLDER:
THE CASE OF SINGAPORE 6–8 (2018),
https://bschool.nus.edu.sg/cgio/wpcontent/uploads/sites/7/2018/10/SOE-The-State-as-Shareholder-2014.pdf
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shareholders may tolerate or approve of compensation practices
where they are perceived to be consistent with shareholder value
maximization particularly when they manage the firms they control
and set the level of their own compensation or that of their affiliated
directors. Depending on the circumstances, however, the presence of
concentrated ownership brings with it different agency problems,
namely the risk of the expropriation of minority shareholder interests
arising from conflicts of interest with the majority shareholders.
B.

Institutional Shareholder Activism

Arguably, a stronger factor accounting for the advent of “say
on pay” reforms in the US and UK is the rise of institutional
shareholder activism, which is less commonly witnessed in Singapore
and Hong Kong. While ownership structures in the US, UK, Canada
and Australia still remain relatively dispersed, concentrated
ownership is making inroads, with growing portfolio investment by
institutional investors (i.e. pension funds, mutual funds, money
managers, insurers, investment banks, commercial trusts, endowment
funds, hedge funds, and private equity). This has led to increased
shareholder activism which has been argued to be instrumental in the
adoption of “say on pay” reforms 175 as institutional investors seek
better alignment between executive remuneration and the long-term
performance of the company.176 In the US and UK, the twenty largest
institutional owners on average hold more than 30% of issued capital
in listed companies.177 Institutional shareholder ownership in the top
1,000 US corporations has increased from below 10% in the early
1950s to over 70%.178 In the UK, institutional shareholder ownership
has historically been high and individual investors now hold only
about 10% of listed shares, with the remainder held by institutional
investors. 179 Institutional investor ownership is also increasingly
[https://perma.cc/V8Y4-ZDFS]; A. Goldstein & P. Pananond, Singapore Inc. Goes
Shopping Abroad: Profits and Pitfalls, 38 J. CONTEMP. ASIA 417, 418–28 (2008).
175
Thomas & van der Elst, supra note 1, at 716. See also Pamela Brandes & Palash Deb,
Executive Compensation and Corporate Governance: What Do We “Know” and Where Are
We Going?, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 222, 229–230
(Douglas Michael Wright et al eds., 2013).
176
Ferrarini & Ungureanu, supra note 5, at 355–57.
177
OECD FACTBOOK 2019, supra note 1, at 17–18.
178
Hill, supra note 49, at 512.
179
Id.
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important in Australia, where the introduction of a compulsory
private pension system in the early 1990s had contributed to a marked
increase in financial intermediaries. 180 A recent OECD study about
ownership in companies from 54 jurisdictions that together represent
95% of global market capitalization found that four main categories
of investors dominate shareholder ownership of today’s publicly
listed companies—institutional investors, public sector owners,
private corporations, and strategic individual investors, with the
largest category being institutional investors, which hold 41% of
global market capitalization. 181
With shareholding patterns
continuing to evolve, the OECD notes that the traditional concepts of
dispersed and concentrated ownership “may no longer be sufficient
as a basis for understanding and adapting corporate governance
frameworks to the more complex landscape of corporate ownership
structures in place around the world.” 182
In principle, broader shareholder ownership by institutional
investors would assist shareholders to overcome the costs of
collective action in monitoring management, even though
institutional investors vary considerably in their capacity and
economic incentives to do so.183 In this regard, the adoption of “say
on pay” in the US was precipitated in part by growing institutional
shareholder activism in the wake of the dot-com bubble burst and
a series of prominent governance and accounting scandals (such as
Worldcom and Enron). These scandals spurred many institutional
investors to take on a more active role in shareholder monitoring,
catalyzing a new wave of shareholder activism. 184 Since 2006,
shareholder activists led by union pension funds had submitted
shareholder proposals to adopt “say on pay” at hundreds of US
companies in an endeavor to induce voluntary or mandatory broadbased adoption of “say on pay.”185 Further factors contributed to
the reconcentration of shares from retail investors to institutional
investors, including low cost diversification, retirement savings plans,
tax benefits and a more permissive regulatory environment, which
180

Id.
OECD FACTBOOK 2019, supra note 1, at 17–18.
182
Id.
183
Id.
184
Fabrizio Ferri & Robert F. Cox, Executive Compensation, Corporate Governance,
and Say on Pay, 12 FOUNDATIONS AND TRENDS IN ACCOUNTING 1, 58 (2018).
185
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181
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facilitated institutional investors’ voting of portfolio shares and
greater shareholder participation that altered the balance of power
between shareholders and managers.186 For example, since 2003, the
SEC has required investment advisers exercising voting authority
over client proxies to exercise their voting rights in the best interests
of clients in accordance with their fiduciary duties and disclose their
proxy voting policies. 187 An important trend has been the
proliferation of stewardship codes following the financial crisis 188
drafted on the premise that institutional investors “as ‘universal
owners’ with broad economic exposure” should exercise their
decision rights to ensure accountability to their beneficiaries and to
promote the interests of society as a whole as stewards of the public
good.189
Under this premise, institutional investors are given a quasiregulatory role with respect to executive compensation by serving as
a valuable check and balance on managerial power in a dispersed
ownership context in accordance with their evolving stewardship
roles. 190
These developments have encouraged shareholder
186
See Edward B. Rock, Adapting to the New Shareholder-Centric Reality, 161 U. PA.
L. REV. 1907, 1917–26 (2013) (concluding that as a result of these factors, the US is
“nowadays much less of a poster child for managerialist corporate law than in the past”).
187
SEC, Proxy Voting by Investment Advisers, 17 C.F.R. Part 275 (2003).
188
See FINANCIAL REPORTING COUNCIL, UK STEWARDSHIP CODE 2 (2012),
https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/d67933f9-ca38-4233-b603-3d24b2f62c5f/UKStewardship-Code-(September-2012).pdf [https://perma.cc/U3UH-E22A] (Stewardship
codes originated in the UK with the issue of the UK Stewardship Code in 2010 by the
Financial Reporting Council). See also Jennifer G. Hill, Good Activist/Bad Activist: The Rise
of International Stewardship Codes, 41 Seattle U. L. Rev. 497, 506–07 (discussing
stewardship codes around the world).
189
See Armour et al., The Basic Governance Structure: Minority Shareholders and NonShareholder Constituencies, supra note 66, at 97. See e.g. Martin Lipton et al., It’s Time To
Adopt The New Paradigm, WACHTELL, LIPTON, ROSEN & KATZ 2, 16 (Feb. 11, 2019),
https://www.wlrk.com/webdocs/wlrknew/WLRKMemos/WLRK/WLRK.26357.19.pdf
[https://perma.cc/G8ZH-JEEB]; JOHN KAY, THE KAY REVIEW OF UK EQUITY MARKETS AND
LONG-TERM
DECISION
MAKING:
FINAL
REPORT
74
(2012),
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_d
ata/file/253454/bis-12-917-kay-review-of-equity-markets-final-report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HP8S-4U9L]; Commission Green Paper: The EU Corporate Governance
Framework, at 2, COM (2011) 164 final (May 4, 2011), https://op.europa.eu/en/publicationdetail/-/publication/3eed7997-d40b-4984-8080-31d7c4e91fb2/language-en
[https://perma.cc/SG6Q-XLGS] (all emphasizing that institutional investors have a duty to
promoting societal interests).
190
Executive Compensation and Say on Pay, EUROPEAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
INSTITUTE,
https://ecgi.global/content/executive-compensation-and-say-pay
[https://perma.cc/2P2K-XZLB] (last visited October 22, 2019).
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participation at both US and foreign portfolio firms and led to a new
industry of governance intermediaries (including Institutional
Shareholder Services (ISS) and Glass Lewis, the two dominant
global proxy advisers). 191 These proxy advisers have been
implicitly granted significant influence by regulators in shaping
corporate governance policies in US public corporations and have
played an important role in ensuring pay-for-performance alignment
in their voting recommendations to institutional investors. 192
While institutional shareholders are on the rise in Singapore
and Hong Kong as well, with institutional investors contributing to
55% of total market turnover on the HKEX in 2018,193 institutional
shareholder activism remains rare and primarily an Anglo-American
phenomenon (and not without its critics).194 Institutional shareholder
activism and private ordering are generally effective only in firms
with dispersed ownership structures, given that they have little
prospect of challenging incumbent boards that are in the hands of
controlling shareholders. 195 The typical activist in Hong Kong owns
a stake of less than 5% of the company’s equity and has to rely on
solidarity with other shareholders in order to engage with
management. Such activists would therefore face the same collective
action problem of dispersed shareholders in monitoring
management.196 For this reason, the introduction by the Hong Kong
Securities and Futures Commission of the “Principles of Responsible
Ownership” based on the UK Stewardship Code has been argued to
have little effect in spurring engagement on the part of institutional
191
Armour et al., The Basic Governance Structure: The Interests of Shareholders as a
Class, supra note 51, at 61.
192
Ferrarini & Ungureanu, supra note 5, at 344.
193
HKEX, CASH MARKET TRANSACTION SURVEY 2018 (FULL REPORT) 1 (2018),
https://www.hkex.com.hk/-/media/HKEX-Market/News/Research-Reports/HKEXSurveys/Cash-Market-Transaction-Survey-2018/cmts2018_fullreport.pdf?la=en
[https://perma.cc/6YF4-PNEZ].
194
See Stephen Foley, Shareholder Activism: Battle for the Boardroom, FINANCIAL
TIMES
(Apr.
24,
2014),
https://www.ft.com/content/a555abec-be32-11e3-961f00144feabdc0 [https://perma.cc/8KZU-RFTC].
195
Yu-Hsin Lin, When Activists Meet Controlling Shareholders in the Shadow of the
Law: A Case Study of Hong Kong, 14 ASIAN J. COMP. L. 1, 3 (2019).
196
James Early & Alex Pape, Why Hong Kong Should Embrace Active Investors, H.K.
ECON. J. (Nov. 10, 2015), http://www.ejinsight.com/20151110-why-hong-kong-shouldembrace-active-investors[https://perma.cc/W7QY-F94G] (contending that “the shorter an
investor’s time horizon, the more likely he is to view himself as a renter than an owner with
concerns about long-term shareholder value creation”).
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shareholders. 197 While investment by Hong Kong’s mandatory
pension schemes in the domestic stock market has increased over the
years, such investment still forms a small proportion of their total
equity investment. With just HK$2 billion on average for each
pension fund scheme constituting less than 1% of market
capitalization on the Hang Seng index, such schemes have been
argued to have little bargaining power in influencing corporate
governance. 198 Institutional shareholder activism is perhaps even
rarer in Singapore, with the market for proxy advisory firms still at a
nascent stage,199 coupled with a government policy that goes against
the grain by requiring funds managed by the sovereign wealth fund
GIC to be invested overseas instead of Singapore companies. 200
Retail investors, fund managers and institutional investors which held
shares via a nominee company or custodian bank had faced a
regulatory barrier to shareholder engagement as they were previously
prevented from attending shareholders’ meetings due to the limit in
the number of proxies at shareholder meetings, and were effectively
disenfranchised. 201 This limitation was only removed in 2016. 202
Hedge fund activism is also almost non-existent in Singapore. 203
Further reasons often cited for the lack of shareholder monitoring
include the passivity of shareholders with a short-term trading
mentality and an Asian market etiquette that discourages outright
conflicts between shareholders and managers.204 That is not to say
that shareholder activism never takes place; rather, it usually occurs
197
John Kong Shan Ho, Bringing Responsible Ownership To The Financial Market Of
Hong Kong: How Effective Could It Be?, 16 J. CORP. LAW STUD. 437, 442–43, 465 (2016).
198
Bryane Michael & S.H. Goo, Corporate Governance and its Reform in Hong Kong:
A Study in Corporate Governance, 15 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 444, 454 (2015).
199
Lan & Varottil, supra note 159, at 582.
200
Section I: What comprises the reserves and who manages them?, SINGAPORE
MINISTRY OF FINANCE, https://www.mof.gov.sg/policies/our-nation%27s-reserves/SectionI-What-comprises-the-reserves-and-who-manages-them [https://perma.cc/7TMA-AQTA].
201
MINISTRY OF FINANCE, supra note 133, at 2–10.
202
Companies Act (Cap. 50, Rev. Ed. 2006), § 181 (Sing.).
203
Jerry Koh, Shareholder Activism And How Directors Can Respond, SINGAPORE
INSTITUTE OF DIRECTORS’ CONFERENCE 2014: TOWARDS THE NEW CAPITALISM 20, 21 (2014),
http://www.eguide.sid.org.sg/images/SIDeGuide/articles/Conference/2014Shareholder%20Activism%20&%20how%20Directors%20respond.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LJ72-7H8E].
204
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2016
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(2016),
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on an ad hoc basis privately between minority and controlling
shareholders or by way of extraordinary publicity campaigns to gain
public support where these private engagements fail. 205 That many
of these institutional investors are foreign are also likely to hinder
their effectiveness as an interest group and reduce the chances that
investor-oriented laws like “say on pay” are enacted. 206
C.

Socio-Political Culture and Role of the State

While arguably akin to LMEs in an economic sense, Hong
Kong and Singapore have been described as distinct from the
standard Western liberal democratic model 207 and defined by their
“corporatist” structures. 208 In such circumstances, one may assert
that Singapore and Hong Kong are more insulated from populist
pressures to curb executive remuneration, wherein institutions may
be designed with a view to broader economic interests and with it, the
interests of corporate elites (i.e. controlling shareholders and
managers) in particular. Socio-political and cultural norms against
excessive executive remuneration and income inequality have served
as a catalyst for pay reforms in the West. Social democracies and leftwing parties with a stronger sense of egalitarianism and distributional
concerns played a role in the introduction of “say on pay” reforms in
Europe.209 More significant is that even with LMEs such as the US
and UK, the populist movements and public pressure arising from the
global financial crisis have compelled legislatures to constrain board
205

Lin, supra note 195, at 22, 26–27. See also Kelvin Koh & Niklas Wong, Giving A
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Shareholders,
TODAY
(Jan.
9,
2019),
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[https://perma.cc/N4UT-S5UF].
206
Ho, supra note 197, at 453; John Armour et al., Beyond the Anatomy, in THE
ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW—A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 268, 270
(Reinier Kraakman et al. eds., 2017).
207
Singapore Parliament, Parliamentary Elections, 27 Aug 2008, Singapore Parliament
Reports, Vol. 84, Col 3406,
https://sprs.parl.gov.sg/search/topic?reportid=016_20080827_S0003_T0003
[https://perma.cc/F8RC-LPHU]; THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT’S DEMOCRACY INDEX
(2018), https://infographics.economist.com/2019/DemocracyIndex [https://perma.cc/7NJ77ES8].
208
Ma Ngok, The Making of a Corporatist State in Hong Kong: The Road to Sectoral
Intervention, 46 J. CONTEMP. ASIA 247, 247–53 (2016); Chris Leggett et al., Employers’
Associations In Singapore: Tripartite Engagement, in EMPLOYERS’ ASSOCIATIONS IN ASIA:
EMPLOYER COLLECTIVE ACTION 82, 89–91 (John Benson et al. eds., 2017).
209
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power in setting executive pay. 210 Despite its historical antipathy
toward “socialism” (as used here in the broad sense), the recent
primary debates have revealed how populist pressures have moved
the Democratic Party’s center of gravity to the left, with a greater
emphasis on the role of the state in regulating market economies,
protecting the weakest sectors of society, reducing poverty and
inequality under the capitalist framework, and strengthening labor
unions.211 This parallels similar historical developments in Europe,
and is in stark contrast with the traditional deregulated, everyone-forhimself, free-market American model, which had contributed to
economic development in the US since the 1950s. 212 Where
concentrated ownership and affiliated managers are prevalent, as in
the cases of Singapore and Hong Kong, however, entrenched
incumbents within the firm can project their influence into the body
politic to resist new regulations which would undermine their
autonomy, perpetuating a path dependent political economy. 213
Well-connected blockholders have been argued to be “an economic
asset for firms in a politicized environment, to the extent that these
‘owners’ have more legitimacy and resources to protect their
companies from political intervention than mere managers backed by
dispersed shareholders could muster.”214
In this connection, it is difficult to classify Singapore and
Hong Kong as strictly LMEs or CMEs. Hong Kong’s corporate sector
is defined by enterprises owned in tight social and familial networks
that have cultivated longstanding relationships with the local and
global banking networks for capital. 215 While its stock markets are
well-developed, Singapore’s capital markets are more oriented
210
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TIMES,
(Aug.
2,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/01/opinion/socialdemocracy.html [https://perma.cc/4Q9U-PF8Z]. Such recent proposals include Medicare for
All or universal health care, raising the minimum wage to $15 an hour, tuition-free higher
public education, and raising taxes on the wealthy.
212
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213
Bebchuk & Roe, supra note 90, at 157; Coffee, The Political Economy Of DoddFrank, supra note 70, at 1030. Short of regulatory capture, this is akin to what Coffee terms
the “Regulatory Sine Curve”—a cycle that is driven by the differential in resources,
organization, and lobbying capacity, which favors those business interests determined to
resist intrusive regulation.
214
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215
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towards bank lending as compared with the US. 216 The “Varieties of
Capitalism” hypothesis fails to account adequately for the role of the
state and the type of democracy within the capitalist system
concerned.217 Both Singapore and Hong Kong are relative outliers
which favor pro-business policies coupled with ownership
concentration by family groups and the state. While their respective
governments have been instrumental in building strong regulatory
frameworks for investment and business-friendly institutions, Hong
Kong remains a bastion of laissez-faire capitalism218 while Singapore
is characterized by its state-driven capitalism. 219 Singapore’s
capitalist system therefore owes its fundamental characteristics to the
economy’s strong reliance on and deep ties to foreign capital and
business.220 While this would ordinarily lead to stronger pressures on
the state to demonstrate credible commitments to international
standards of best practice, including strong protections for
shareholders, this is militated against by the pre-existing dominant
structural ownership by families and the state in listed entities. 221
Both may therefore be said to have a “hybrid” capitalist model.
Both polities also rank relatively low in terms of income inequality,
with Singapore—which has not introduced a minimum wage—
ranking among the bottom 10 countries in the world for its efforts to
reduce inequality.222 The structural nature of income inequality in
Hong Kong is rooted in its political environment, with its complex
historical and political relationship with China, 223 which has been
argued to allow for disproportionate influence by corporate and
economic elites, notwithstanding the democratization agenda
216
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218
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in Hong Kong’s recent protests against the Chinese government).
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provided by the “One Country Two Systems” framework under its
Constitution, the Basic Law. 224 Hong Kong adds a new dimension to
the vexed issue of the role of business in politics in a capitalist society.
It has been reported that the support of business elites is pivotal to the
Chief Executive’s election, with half of the seats in the legislative
council reserved for specific sectors or industries comprising interest
group constituencies representing predominantly business
interests. 225 With effective veto power over the group of directly
elected lawmakers, these functional representatives have been
contended to have the ability to impede policies which might affect
business interests, with the result that the Hong Kong’s governance
has continued to be distinctively pro-business in its outlook. 226
Further, the interests of controlling shareholders or families
representing the most powerful groups in Hong Kong are said to be
further promoted by political connections, and the Hong Kong
government has been often criticized for being too close with
powerful vested business interests.227
It is argued that any attempt to incorporate broader
stakeholder (in particular, employee) interests in the design of
remuneration packages, including imposing similar requirements for
listed companies to disclose the ratio of the remuneration of key
executives to the remuneration of employees, is unlikely in view of
the existing structural frameworks in Singapore and Hong Kong’s
industrial relations. Such reforms do not cohere well with
Singapore’s consensus-driven policy of tripartism, which refers to the
224

The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s
Republic of China (adopted at the Third Session of the Seventh National People’s Congress
on Apr. 4 1990, promulgated by Order No. 26 of the President of the People’s Republic of
China
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Apr.
4,
1990,
effective
as
of
July
1,
1997),
https://www.basiclaw.gov.hk/en/basiclawtext/images/basiclaw_full_text_en.pdf
[https://perma.cc/F8UD-P8G8]. See generally Tai-lok Lui et al., Introduction: The Long
Transition, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY HONG KONG 1, 1–28 (Tai-lok Lui
et al. eds., 2019) (describing Hong Kong’s transition back to Chinese rule under the “One
Country, Two Systems” framework).
225
Tai-Wing Ngo, A Genealogy of Business and Politics in Hong Kong, in ROUTLEDGE
HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY HONG KONG 331–32 (Tai-lok Lui et al. eds., 2019); Mathew
Wong, Political Economy of Hong Kong: Income Inequality and Housing Issues, ASIA
DIALOGUE, (Jun. 30, 2017), https://theasiadialogue.com/2017/06/30/political-economy-ofhong-kong-income-inequality-and-housing-issues [https://perma.cc/AAB4-5VZC]; L EO F.
GOODSTADT, UNEASY PARTNERS: THE CONFLICT BETWEEN PUBLIC INTEREST AND PRIVATE
PROFIT IN HONG KONG 126 (2005).
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collaboration amongst labor unions represented by the National
Trades Union Congress (NTUC), employers represented by the
Singapore National Employers Federation, and the government. 228
Tripartism was instituted during Singapore’s stage as a
developmental state to guard against industrial strife, and manage
labor costs and labor-management relations to secure a key
competitive advantage for Singapore. This enabled the government
to intervene in the labor market through the regulation of manpower
planning, wage determination and skills upgrading. 229 Under
Singapore’s tripartite framework, the National Wage Council—a
tripartite body consisting of representatives of employers, trade
unions and the government—conducts annual deliberations to forge
a “national consensus” on salary and related matters. On the basis of
the tripartite consensus reached during the deliberations, it issues
annual guidelines on wage-adjustment recommendations, taking into
account public views and factors such as “productivity growth,
employment situation, international competitiveness, and economic
growth and prospects.” These guidelines are relied upon as a
reference point by companies in determining salary increments for
their employees.230 In Hong Kong, labor relations are described as
“quiescent” and collective bargaining generally takes place only with
respect to the few large and prominent organizations. 231 Pay issues
in Singapore and Hong Kong are dealt with against a highly fluid
labor market, with the World Economic Forum’s latest Global
Competitiveness Report ranking them amongst the highest in terms
of hiring and firing flexibility.232 Under such frameworks, there is
arguably less room for stakeholder interests in their corporate
governance models than the US and UK. Singapore and Hong Kong’s
CEO pay-to-average income ratio also trails the US and UK, which
further militates against the likelihood of such reforms. 233
228
SINGAPORE MINISTRY OF MANPOWER, WHAT IS TRIPARTISM (2016),
https://www.mom.gov.sg/employment-practices/tripartism-in-singapore/what-is-tripartism
[https://perma.cc/PZ5V-LV2M].
229
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https://www.tripartism.sg/page/National-Wages-Council [https://perma.cc/N9SC-WMXQ]
(last visited Oct 24, 2019).
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Redding et al., supra note 21, at 42–43.
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WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, supra note 26, at 266–68, 506–08.
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Corporate Culture and Confucian Capitalism

Studies increasingly affirm culture as an institution in itself,
which can exert substantial influence on corporate decision-making.
Cultural values between different jurisdictions may influence the
level of acceptance or acquiescence of managerial remuneration
packages, including the appropriate structure and amount of such
packages, independent of the legal regime. 234 Cultural orientations
manifest themselves in the design of executive agreements, levels of
compensation, social tolerance for economic inequality and attitudes
in general toward remuneration disclosure. 235 While “Asian
values”—the notion that East Asia’s economic success in the nineties
was attributed to its culture of Confucianism—was largely
discredited after the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997,236 it is argued that
they have proven their resilience in the important role they play in
Singapore and Hong Kong’s corporate culture. In this connection, it
is interesting to note from history an important white paper released
by Singapore during the height of the “Asian values” debate, which
purported to set out a set of “Shared Values” by which Singaporeans
could live by. The paper highlighted, inter alia, that unlike the West,
“Singapore is an Asian society” that “has always weighted group
interests more heavily than individual ones” and where issues are
resolved “through consensus instead of contention.” 237 As
importantly, the paper also noted that family is “the basic unit of
society” and “[m]any Confucian ideals are relevant to Singapore,” in
particular, the “strictly hierarchical” nature of [t]raditional Confucian
family relationships,” albeit noting that “the Confucian concept of
more-than-you-do-in-a-year [https://perma.cc/R62H-VFJB]. See also Anders Melin & Wei
Lu, CEOs in U.S., India Earn The Most Compared With Average Workers, BLOOMBERG
(Dec. 28, 2017, 9:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-12-28/ceos-inu-s-india-earn-the-most-compared-with-average-workers [https://perma.cc/DE8N-EZKP].
234
Amir N. Licht, Culture and Law in Corporate Governance, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE 129, 144, 149–150 (Jeffery N. Gordon
& Wolf-Georg Ringe eds, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018).
235
Hill, supra note 79, at 219, 221 (and accompanying endnotes).
236
Fareed Zakaria, The Dustbin of History: Asian Values, FOREIGN POL’Y (Nov. 9,
2009),
https://foreignpolicy.com/2009/11/09/the-dustbin-of-history-asian-values/
[https://perma.cc/B2P4-BGCS]
237
Shared Values White Paper (Cmd 1 of 1991) (Singapore National Printers 1991) ¶¶
14, 26,
https://www.academia.edu/36190449/Shared_Values_White_Paper_Singapore_
[https://perma.cc/5YUY-VHHD?type=image].
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family ties” had historically “led to nepotism.” 238 Employing the
terminology advanced by Hofstede and Schwartz, 239 corporate
culture in neo-Confucianist societies with Chinese ethnic majorities
such as Singapore and Hong Kong may be characterized by
paternalistic control by dominant owners, relative power distance and
a sense of hierarchy limiting manager-worker interdependence. This
may indirectly explain the subordination of the role of broader
shareholders in capital markets and corporate governance, and the
entrenchment of the relationship between ownership and control. 240
Ruskola offered a three-fold typology of the business enterprise—
liberal, Confucian and socialist. At risk of oversimplification,
“liberal” firms prevalent in the West, on which the Anglo-American
“theory of the firm” is premised, are organized according to the
economic logic of contract, with each actor—managers, shareholders
and workers—acting rationally in the pursuit of their respective selfinterests and the profit incentive. In contrast, “Confucian” family
firms—or what Ruskola has termed “clan corporations” —prevalent
in Chinese businesses are organized on the fiduciary logic of kinship
relations, which emphasize interpersonal hierarchies, long-term
stability and non-confrontation, as opposed to individualism and
short-term interests.241 The Chinese family firm has been said to have
a management structure rooted in Chinese social history and tend to
be run by dominant owners, who make all important decisions and
are assisted by family members and trusted subordinates. Corporate
decision-making is embodied by a spirit of paternalism and conveys
“the Confucian ideals of responsibility downwards in exchange for
disciplined obedience upwards” and “[s]ocial respect is accorded to
238

Id. at ¶¶ 41, 43, 44.
GEERT H. HOFSTEDE, CULTURE’S CONSEQUENCES: COMPARING VALUES, BEHAVIORS,
INSTITUTIONS, AND ORGANIZATIONS ACROSS NATIONS 104 (2001); Shalom H. Schwartz,
Culture Matters: National Value Cultures, Sources, and Consequences, in UNDERSTANDING
CULTURE: THEORY, RESEARCH, AND APPLICATION 127, 136 (Robert S. Wyerm et al., 2009).
Hofstede identified five value dimensions which been cited widely in studies on corporate
governance, accounting and management: (i) individualism/collectivism, (ii) power distance,
(iii) uncertainty avoidance, (iv) masculinity/femininity, and (v) long-term orientation (or
Confucian work dynamism). Schwartz identified seven cultural value orientations based on
an analysis of data across 75 countries: (i) embeddedness, (ii) hierarchy, (iii) mastery, (iv)
affective autonomy, (v) intellectual autonomy, (vi) egalitarianism, and (vii) harmony.
240
Redding et al., supra note 21, at 40; Redding et al., Culture and the Business Systems
of Asia, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ASIAN BUSINESS SYSTEMS 358, 366–67 (Michael A.
Witt & Gordon Redding, 2014).
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owners, not employees.” 242 In a leading Singapore case on the
common law derivative action, the Singapore Court of Appeal
inferred that the influence of family relationships on business
decisions cannot be discounted in an “Asian family which still tends
to be rather clan-like, especially where the ties are through blood
rather than marriage.”243
Any discussion of culture, however, opens a Pandora’s Box
of controversies as to its implications—what does one make of the
influence of “Confucian paternalism” by corporate managers in
corporate decision-making and its implications for executive
remuneration, for example? On the one hand, it suggests that the
priority of the collective interest of the firm over self-interest would
lead to self-restraint on the part of owner-managers not to extract
beyond a fair share of their contribution to the firm’s value in view of
the interests of other stakeholders. Donald thus argues that the
limited liability company originating from the West, which was
designed largely to allow a firm to transact with the financial system
and investors to profit from the firm’s business, should be adjusted to
reflect the distinct corporate environment of Asia. Values which a
family might find important, such as firm autonomy, longevity or
culture, are not taken into account in the Anglo-American corporate
model which is premised on short-term value maximization of the
firm. 244 This ostensibly suggests that regulatory restrictions on
managerial discretion such as “say on pay” are unnecessary because
owner-managers are able to make such decisions in the best interests
of the firm. While this is a compelling argument, one finds it difficult
to ignore the possibility of nepotism in an environment that
emphasizes family loyalty and the risks of managerial
unaccountability in a paternalistic hierarchical framework based upon
power distance. In an empirical study of 609 firms listed on the SGX,
it was reported that companies, which disclosed employees who were
family members of a director or the CEO and earned at least $50,000
in annual compensation (as required by the Singapore Code of
Corporate Governance), generally also paid higher compensation to
directors and key management relative to market capitalization,
242

Redding et al., supra note 21, at 41 (and accompanying endnotes).
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revenues and total assets. Such companies with higher compensation
also tended to be less transparent in their compensation
disclosures. 245 This, the report noted, suggested that “companies
with extensive family involvement in the business are less efficient
or pay higher remuneration,” and it recommended that regulators
“consider requiring or recommending the disclosure of the total
remuneration paid to the controlling shareholder and family members”
to provide stronger safeguards against excessive compensation in
founder- and family controlled firms. 246 The report’s author also
noted that unlike in professionally managed firms where CEO pay is
generally benchmarked with peer companies of similar industry and
size, in family-managed firms, family shareholders generally have a
great deal of influence over compensation, with remuneration
consultants and independent directors having little influence. This
has often resulted in CEOs in family-managed firms receiving much
higher compensation than their counterparts in professionally
managed firms.247 The cultural emphasis on non-confrontation may
also explain the passivity of shareholder culture particularly in
Singapore, which may increase the risk of managerial opportunism
and unaccountability. It has been observed that the shareholder
community in Singapore does not generally monitor executive
remuneration and tend to entrust the board of directors to oversee the
firm in the belief that they would drive corporate performance in the
firm’s best interests. Intrusive questions from shareholders are
therefore the exception rather than the norm. 248 In this regard, both
Singapore and Hong Kong challenge Roe’s “social democracy”
theory which had suggested a binary distinction between social and
non-social democracies and that left-leaning social democracies
induce concentrated shareholdings in order to counterbalance the
245
MAK YUEN TEEN & CHEW YI HONG, THE SINGAPORE REPORT ON REMUNERATION
PRACTICES:
AVOIDING
THE
APAYCALYPSE
VOLUME
I
5,
31
(2018),
https://governanceforstakeholders.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/RemunerationPractices-Volume-1-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/6K2L-4YA2]
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Id. at 42, 45.
247
Vivien Shiao, Fat Cats Or Top Dogs: Is The Singapore CEO Overpaid?, THE
BUSINESS TIMES (Mar.16, 2019), https://www.businesstimes.com.sg/brunch/fat-cats-or-topdogs-is-the-singapore-ceo-overpaid [https://perma.cc/U3RK-BKF6].
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Study, THE BUS. TIMES, (Sept. 14, 2017), https://www.businesstimes.com.sg/companiesmarkets/ceo-pay-at-singapore-listed-firms-not-aligned-with-performance-study
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influence of labor in firm management.249 Such a hypothesis cannot
explain the positions of common law countries such Singapore and
Hong Kong vis-à-vis the UK and the US, where concentrated
shareholdings have arisen in the former in spite of the lack of the
labor influence on corporate management or stakeholder orientation
in their corporate governance.

V.

POLICY RESPONSES FOR SINGAPORE AND HONG
KONG

So long as these institutional arrangements in Singapore and
Hong Kong discussed above persist in their current forms, which
seem highly probable, “say on pay” is likely to be less effective as a
means of mobilizing shareholder (and broader societal) opposition
against high executive pay levels. Their attendant implications for
regulatory reforms are also likely to continue. In jurisdictions with
concentrated ownership, controlling shareholders are liable to block
legal reforms which restrict their private benefits, whereas in
jurisdictions where dispersed ownership prevails, public institutions
and the broader investor class are likely to have greater political
influence to push for reforms to limit minority expropriation. 250
Where such path dependence persists, it is said that they can only be
overcome by sufficiently large efficiency gains 251—if this is correct,
the question is whether “say on pay” reforms may achieve more
economically efficient outcomes on a relative basis for executive
remuneration in the particular contexts examined.
As the efficacy of legal mechanisms are closely related to the
extent to which principals are capable of coordinating amongst
themselves, one may anticipate institutional complementarities
between share ownership structures and the types of mechanisms
relied on to constrain agency costs. Where such coordination costs
are low, principals (i.e. controlling shareholders) are able to rely on
less intrusive governance strategies to control managers, as opposed

249
Roe, supra note 147, at 252, 254–65. See MARK J. ROE, POLITICAL DETERMINANTS
OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: POLITICAL CONTEXT, CORPORATE IMPACT 23–25 (2003). See
also BRUNER, supra note 152, at 126–27.
250
Armour et al., The Basic Governance Structure: Minority Shareholders and NonShareholder Constituencies, supra note 66, at 104.
251
Bebchuk & Roe, supra note 90, at 147.
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to more robust regulatory strategies.252 Not instituting “say on pay”
in such circumstances makes sense not least in respect of the
regulatory and compliance costs which would be incurred by firms to
hold a regular shareholder vote on executive remuneration.
A.

Institutional Complementarities and Path Dependence

In view of the prevailing institutional complementarities in
Singapore and Hong Kong, in respect of which key corporate
institutions complement and derive their value, introducing “say on
pay” may not lead to anticipated efficiency gains but instead result in
unintended consequences later. In this regard, it has been argued that
several American mechanisms for shareholder power which have
been transplanted to Asia, such as independent directors and
derivative actions, have tended to turn into localized forms and bring
unexpected consequences. 253 For example, as opposed to the
conception of US-style independent directors as a watchdog for
dispersed minority shareholders, independent directors in familycontrolled firms in Singapore might have ironically been used to
reinforce controlling shareholder power by leveraging their close ties
with family controllers to act as mediators in inter-family shareholder
disputes and/or trusted advisors to the family chairman.254 Failure to
adapt the legal rule to the local context is likely to lead to the creation
of a “legal irritant” by irritating law’s “binding arrangements,” which
sets off a whole chain of new and unexpected results.255
In this regard, this article argues that such institutional
complementarities in Singapore and Hong Kong include, in particular,
the existing legal regime governing related-party transactions (RPTs).
Currently, regulatory reforms in Singapore and Hong Kong are
focused on improving the disclosure of executive remuneration and
252
John Armour, Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Agency Problems and Legal
Strategies, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW—A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL
APPROACH 30, 46 (Reinier Kraakman et al. eds., 2017).
253
Dan W. Puchniak, Multiple Faces of Shareholder Power in Asia: Complexity
Revealed, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON SHAREHOLDER POWER 511, 512–14 (Jennifer G. Hill
& Randall S. Thomas, 2015); Lin, supra note 195, at 4–5.
254
Dan W. Puchniak & Luh Luh Lan, Independent Directors in Singapore: Puzzling
Compliance Requiring Explanation, 65 AM. J. COMP. L. 265, 270 (2017).
255
Gunther Teubner, Legal Irritants: How Unifying Law Ends up in New Divergences,
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ADVANTAGE 417, 418 (Peter A. Hall & David Soskice eds., 2001).
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strengthening the regulatory framework governing independent
directors as the primary means of regulating managerial power and
executive pay. 256 Strengthening the disclosure and independent
director regimes may benefit minority investors to the extent that they
may mitigate the information asymmetry with majority shareholders
and serve as a check on insider directors. Introducing “say on pay”,
however, may eliminate any benefits arising therefrom by shifting the
balance in favor of controlling shareholder power. For jurisdictions
characterized by controlling ownership structures, shareholder
approval of remuneration is likely to be a mere formality, which
would do little to curb pay, and instead further aggrandize majority
shareholder power leading to the unintended consequence of
permitting majority shareholder approval of excessive executive
compensation at the expense of minority shareholders. At the same
time, it is doubtful if strengthening the disclosure and independent
director regimes alone can work sufficiently to regulate
compensation practices. The different institutional settings in
Singapore and Hong Kong encourage different economic incentives
for executive remuneration in Singapore.
While controlling
shareholders are able to use non-monetary incentives to align
managerial interests with those of the firm, this may have the
consequence (intended or unintended) of tying managerial interests
with those of the controlling shareholders. 257 As a result, boards in
controlled companies are often dominated by insiders aligned to or
affiliated with controlling shareholders who lack the independent
capacity to exercise effective oversight of the compensation setting
process.258 In such circumstances, the problems revolve less around
excessive compensation per se but in ensuring that effective
mechanisms are in place to tie managerial incentives with the long
term interests of the firm as a whole.259
Further, implementing “say on pay” reforms in Singapore and
Hong Kong may undermine reliance on RPTs as a regulatory tool to
protect minority shareholders. The factors that appear to have led to
the successful implementation of “say on pay” in the UK and
Australia—including the presence of large institutional investors with
256
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direct contact with corporations, which are willing and able to vote
against a remuneration report—do not exist to the same extent in
Singapore and Hong Kong at the moment. Therefore, a “one size fits
all” approach to “say on pay” is unlikely to be easily transferrable. 260
Regulators may continue to promote greater shareholder engagement,
independent directors and improved corporate disclosure on
remuneration practices as the less costly and more limited form of
intervention, which would allow for greater flexibilities and latitude
in remuneration-setting in concentrated ownership companies. 261
This may allow for greater input by minority shareholders on
remuneration matters but at the same time preserve the prerogative of
the board and the majority shareholders in the remuneration setting
process. At the same time, however, the risks of the board becoming
passive or captured by the majority shareholders increases with
concentrated shareholdings.262 This creates the separate agency risk
of “tunneling” or expropriation of minority interests by controlling
shareholders, 263 and by extension, negative externalities at the
expense of the interests of employees, creditors and broader
stakeholders.
On one view, a majority shareholder may—under certain
circumstances—be better positioned to make credible commitments
to workers, which may facilitate employee relations. 264 Others,
however, argue that the presence of controlling shareholders
increases the risk of exploitation of workers. 265 It may also be argued
that with ownership and control remaining firmly in the hands of
families or the state, coupled with a cultural aversion to risk-taking,
owners and managers in Singapore and Hong Kong are shielded from
short-term capital market pressures, such as hostile takeovers, and do
not feel the same pressure to meet quarterly performance expectations
in the same way as American companies, with the result that a long260
OECD, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: KEY FINDINGS AND
MAIN MESSAGES 24 (June 2009),
https://www.oecd.org/corporate/ca/corporategovernanceprinciples/43056196.pdf
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261
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term view of shareholder value is taken. 266 In this regard, the
presence of a block shareholder has been linked to significantly lower
CEO pay.267 At the same time, the lack of a stakeholder orientation
and a fluid labor market coupled with strong managerial and
controlling shareholder power might mean that employee interests
are less likely to be safeguarded in these contexts. 268
One, however, cannot overlook the risk of collusion between
the board, management and majority shareholders. Remuneration
committees may not exercise effective oversight of remuneration
because they risk losing their board seats if they object or are the
beneficiaries of generous remuneration packages themselves; ownermanagers may in turn favor generous compensation packages to
themselves and to professional managers who acquiesce to minority
expropriation.269 This is especially since controlling shareholders are
not generally subject to any fiduciary duties unless they are deemed
to be acting as de facto or shadow directors. 270 As highlighted by the
OECD, the prevalence of controlling shareholders and corporate
groups increases the importance of minority shareholder protection
especially since related party transactions are a common business
feature in Asia, which increases the possibilities of abuse. 271 In Hong
Kong, conflicts of interest are likely to arise between controlling and
minority shareholders given the common overlap between controlling
shareholders and board control, which increases the risks of selfdealing.272 In its study of 412 public-listed Hong Kong firms during
1995–1998, Cheung et al. found a positive relationship between cash
266
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compensation received by the CEO and Chairman and their
respective equity holdings for levels of shareholdings of up to 35%
in small companies and 10% in large companies, with CEOs with no
shareholdings receiving lower cash compensation compared with
CEOs with share ownership. The results were interpreted by the
authors to suggest that the presence of information asymmetry
between owner-managers and external investors may induce the
former to invoke their shareholder rights to extract higher
compensation for themselves. 273 Independent directors in Hong
Kong and Singapore are also appointed with the support of
controlling shareholders and are often affiliated with the incumbent
directors 274 —in such circumstances, the presence of independent
directors on the board may add little value as a source of
monitoring. 275 After a certain point, it is not clear if increasing
disclosure requirements and the independence of directors would be
effective in the face of opposition and stonewalling by concentrated
shareholders with vested interests.
B.

Executive Compensation, Controlling Shareholders and
Tunneling

A more nuanced analysis of controlled companies indicates
that block shareholdings may either be efficient or inefficient
depending on, inter alia, the effectiveness of the regulatory regime. 276
In the case of efficient controlled shareholdings, the regulatory
regime plays an important role in moderating the conduct of the block
shareholders such that the benefits accruing from the ability of the
block shareholders to monitor the managers are shared with the
minority shareholders, and their private benefits of control do not
exceed the benefits of monitoring management. 277 On this basis, it is
273
Yan-Leung Cheung et al., Ownership Concentration and Executive Compensation in
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argued that in addition to strengthening the disclosure requirements
of executive remuneration in Singapore and Hong Kong, a more
effective regulatory tool would be to reinforce the existing
requirements of ex ante shareholder approval of RPTs, which are
designed in response to the complex family and other structures in
place. 278 An alternative would be to require a supermajority
shareholder vote to approve remuneration packages to enfranchise
minority shareholders.279
Executive remuneration is currently generally exempt from
the RPT requirements in Singapore and Hong Kong, 280 but share
options granted to a director and other relevant parties under a share
option scheme of the listed issuer or any of its subsidiaries must be
approved by independent non-executive directors (in the case of
Hong Kong) and independent shareholders (in the case of
Singapore) 281 In this regard, in its review of the RPT regulatory
framework in Hong Kong, the HKEX took cognizance of the “say on
pay” requirements introduced by the SEC in the US, but emphasized
the prevalence of closely-held issuers in Hong Kong which merited a
different regulatory approach.282 A recent study on Israeli companies
shows that minority veto rights are effective in constraining the pay
of controller executives. 283 Further, the current difficulties in the
private enforcement of shareholder rights in Singapore and Hong
278
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Kong arguably justifies the use of ex ante governance measures with
regulatory backing to empower shareholders, as opposed to ex post
regulatory strategies such as the statutory derivative action to enforce
minority protection rights.284 Singapore and Hong Kong further lack
strong external governance mechanisms, which can alter the balance
of power against controlling shareholders, such as US-style
contingency fee-based shareholder litigation and class action regimes,
and an active market for corporate control. 285 In Hong Kong, no
listed company was faced with an unfair prejudice claim from 2004
to 2014. 286 Singapore has also experienced a dearth of derivative
actions against listed companies.287
It may be argued that requiring “majority of the minority”
(MoM) approval for executive compensation imposes unnecessary
regulatory costs for companies given that the requirement of ex ante
shareholder approval of RPTs are generally preserved for “significant”
transactions not carried out in the ordinary course of business. In this
regard, “say on pay” rules were developed separately from the
general rules on self-dealing transactions by the board of directors,
presumably because shareholders might otherwise have to assess
transactions, which, from the point of view of the firm, are routine
and not significant. As Davies noted, the exclusion of “say on pay”
demonstrates that the basis of the general rules on self-dealing
transactions in the UK Listing Rules is shareholder protection of
large-scale firm expropriation rather than a policy of reviewing
managers’ remuneration.288 It is also important to note that where the
managers are (or are affiliated with) the controlling shareholders
themselves, as is common in business families, executive pay would
matter less as such managers would likely have other less visible
means of self-aggrandizement such as through an increase in
dividends or entering into ostensibly arms-length commercial
284
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transactions with the company. The difficulty therefore for the
regulatory design is deciding what are the types and thresholds of
executive compensation which may be deemed “value-destroying”
and “unfair” (i.e. bad for shareholders and for society as a whole),
along with the necessary carve-outs, within the specific contexts in
Singapore and Hong Kong, respectively, in order to avoid
unnecessary regulatory costs of impeding economically efficient
executive compensation.289 Such reforms may be prudent especially
because of the possible increase in shareholder participation in the
future with the recent promulgation of the “Principles of Responsible
Ownership” in 2016 in Hong Kong and the relaxation of proxy voting
in Singapore, along with the increasing internationalization of the
shareholder base and changing dynamics between companies and
shareholders through new technological developments. 290

VI.

CONCLUSION

In the preceding analysis of the current trends in “say on pay”
regulation along with their implications for the traditional common
law corporate model within the evolving capitalist framework, it is
argued that the underlying capitalist institutions of political economy
that support the regulatory state are better indicators over the
prospects of the adoption and successful implementation of
internationally prescribed standards governing executive
remuneration. As seen, the institutional settings in Singapore and
Hong Kong are very different from those in the US and UK. These
include the presence of concentrated ownership by families and the
state, which discourages institutional shareholder activism, as well as
a socio-political culture and ethos that militate against the prospect of
taking into account broader stakeholder interests in pay governance.
Shareholders—particularly majority shareholders—bear the direct
cost of misaligned pay and inefficient managerial incentives, and are
thus incentivized to choose optimal contracts. 291 If so, “say on pay”
regulation can only be beneficial and economically efficient when
289
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there are market failures arising from the pre-existing institutional
framework of remuneration-setting. 292 Imposing “say on pay”
without regard to these institutional factors may demonstrate credible
commitments on the part of the state to international investors but pay
lip service to constraining executive pay and promoting executive
accountability. On this basis, it would be incorrect and oversimplistic to claim that “say on pay” reforms are necessary to improve
corporate performance as international “global governance”
standards would suggest. On the contrary, such reforms may lead to
unintended regulatory consequences in Singapore and Hong Kong by
either having no or little effect on restricting executive remuneration.
Such reforms may even lead to shareholder acquiescence or
encouragement of misaligned executive remuneration, especially
considering that the efficacy of “say on pay” reforms in providing for
economically efficient executive remuneration in the US and UK are
still inconclusive to date.293
At the same time, these same institutional factors, which
militate against the likelihood of the successful regulatory adoption
of “say on pay” in Singapore and Hong Kong, are also reasons why
further regulatory reforms may be necessary to prevent the “tyranny
of the majority (shareholder).” The presence of controlling
ownership by family groups and the state give rise to the potential for
separate agency costs by increasing conflicts between controlling and
minority shareholders, and between shareholders and broader
stakeholders (in particular, employees). 294 In this regard, the
necessity of “say on pay” reforms would depend on the extent to
which executive remuneration in Singapore and Hong Kong continue
to be effectively regulated in the future under the existing frameworks
pursuant to the requirements relating to remuneration disclosures and
independent directors, as well as the manner in which executive
remuneration continue to rise out of alignment with firm value. If
these trends suggest the necessity for further regulation, requiring
292
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separate MoM approval for certain prescribed thresholds and types of
executive compensation which fall within the category of undesirable
RPTs may serve to empower the minority to prevent potential
disguised tunneling. Concurrently, this avoids the disruption of
existing shareholding structures by keeping management power in
the hands of controlling shareholders and possibly incentivizing them
to act in the firm’s interests.295 One may also consider the possibility
for the firm to conduct a separate supermajority shareholder vote to
determine if minority shareholders may choose to opt-out of such a
regulatory requirement on an ex ante basis, especially since the
necessity for such MoM approval may depend from firm to firm with
different business practices and the types and configuration of
shareholders therein. Such ex ante governance measures are
particularly important in view of the weaknesses of ex post regulatory
measures currently in place in Singapore and Hong Kong, given the
difficulties in shareholder litigation in both jurisdictions. 296 This
calls for a well-calibrated regulatory design by ensuring that the
benefits of requiring MoM approval outweighs the regulatory costs
of conducting a regular MoM shareholder vote for what are otherwise
routine transactions which are normally carried out in the ordinary
course of business.297
The foregoing suggests that the presumptions underlying
orthodox corporate governance theories such as the “Varieties of
Capitalism” theory, 298 Roe’s “social democracy” theory, 299 and the
“law matters” theory 300 are useful only as starting points, but are
insufficient on their own to explain or predict regulatory reforms,
particularly in the Asian context. Ultimately, the prospect of
regulatory convergence depends on the degree in which the
divergences in the institutions of political economy amongst common
law systems reflect variances not with reference to a standardized
governance metric, but rather differences in objectives which each
jurisdiction expects the corporate governance framework to
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achieve. 301 Put simply, one has to examine each corporate
governance system on its own terms and not simply with respect to
an overarching theory that purports to be all-encompassing.
Regulatory divergences thus reflects differences in the social and
economic priorities which each jurisdiction seeks to manage through
the fluctuating balance of power amongst executives, investors,
employees and above all, the state, within the respective corporate
governance systems with reference to the diversity in historical,
cultural and political contexts. 302 This implies that corporate
governance reforms should accommodate these circumstances in a
manner that provides the right incentives for both entrepreneurs and
investors to contribute to capital formation, the efficient use of capital
and market competition.303 Only then would policymakers provide
market participants with a sound basis to exploit new business
opportunities and innovate in a globalized economy, and ensure the
most economically efficient allocation of capital and corporate
resources, which ultimately contribute economic value for the
corporation’s stakeholders and broader society. 304
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